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The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and passage of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) shortly after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, collectively constitute the most significant bureaucratic 
shakeup of the national security apparatus since the National Security Act of 1947.  
Roughly 10 years following the creation of DHS, questions linger as to whether these 
reforms have addressed the major domestic intelligence shortfalls identified in numerous 
post-9/11 congressional hearings and in the final report of the 9/11 Commission. 
This thesis seeks to answer those questions by examining the performance of the 
U.S. domestic intelligence system since 9/11 along three fronts: intelligence fusion, 
institutional evolution, and intelligence prioritization.  Citing the literature from current 
and former homeland security practitioners, academic experts, non-partisan analysts, and 
print media commentators, this paper concludes that while key measures of progress on 
these fronts have been observed, shortfalls within the domestic intelligence system do 
nevertheless remain, requiring further oversight and guidance from federal homeland 
security policymakers. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: EXAMINING WHERE U.S. DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN IN ORDER TO KNOW  WHERE IT IS 
GOING ..........................................................................................................................1 
A. QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER .......................................................................2 
B. A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING AREAS OF CONTINUING 
CHALLENGE IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ......................................3 
C. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................5 
D. ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................6 
II. DHS, THE IC, AND FUSION: ONGOING CHALLENGES TO 
INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION ...........................................................................7 
A. THE CHALLENGES OF BEING ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE .......8 
B. PROVIDING VALUE-ADDED TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
CUSTOMER ..................................................................................................10 
C. THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DISSEMINATING 
AND COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE................................................12 
D. THE YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON ANALYSIS .........16 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................18 
III. INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
SPHERE: A SLOW AND HALTING AFFAIR ......................................................21 
A. SEARCHING FOR CLEARER DIRECTION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN DHS ..........................................................22 
B. CONTINUING ISSUES OF FRAGMENTATION WITHIN THE 
BROADER IC ................................................................................................28 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................33 
IV. JACK OF ALL TRADES, MASTER OF NONE?: CHALLENGES IN 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIZATION ............................................37 
A. THE INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIZATION PROBLEM DEFINED .....37 
B. DRAWBACKS OF THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH .........................38 
C. OVEREMPHASIS ON COLLECTION AT THE EXPENSE OF 
ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................40 
D. LACK OF EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR MEASURING SUCCESS OF 
TARGETED INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION .....................................44 
E. REDUNDANCIES, AMBIGUITIES, AND LOST 
ACCOUNTABILITY RESULTING FROM OVERLAPPING 
MISSIONS ......................................................................................................46 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
V. THE WORK HAS JUST BEGUN: CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES FOR 
IMPROVING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE .......................................................51 
A. CONSOLIDATION .......................................................................................52 
B. SPECIALIZATION .......................................................................................53 
 viii 
C. THE FOREIGN-DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIDE .......................55 
D. ACTING LIKE THE ADVERSARY IN ORDER TO DEFEAT IT .........56 
E. SHOULD THE IC BE EXPANDED? ..........................................................58 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................58 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................61 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DHSI DHS Intelligence Enterprise 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
HSIN-CS Homeland Security Information Sharing Network Critical Sectors 
Portal 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
I&A DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
IC Intelligence Community 
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IG Inspector General 
IO DHS Intelligence Officer 
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
NCRIC Northern California Regional Intelligence Center 
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 
SIN Standing Information Need 
TSA Transportation Security Administration 
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 x 




To Andria, a truly creative mind, treasured lifelong companion, and incredible 
mother, whose sacrifices as a military spouse have allowed our family to flourish and me 
to work in a gratifying career field.  I am indebted to you for your constant love and 
support. 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION: EXAMINING WHERE U.S. DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN IN ORDER TO KNOW  
WHERE IT IS GOING 
With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 
and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) post and National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the national security apparatus underwent its largest 
reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947.  Considering the significant 
amounts of federal budget money, congressional staff time, and executive policy 
planning that have gone into how best to secure the homeland after the 9/11 attacks, an 
analysis of how effective the U.S. government’s efforts have been over the last decade is 
warranted.  Furthermore, it is critical to examine whether the new intelligence construct 
has successfully addressed the primary challenges brought to light by the 9/11 
Commission and others.  Such an examination becomes particularly important in periods 
of fiscal challenge, such as the one this country is about to embark on in the face of 
ballooning federal deficits and slow economic growth.  
Unless the American voting public is convinced that intelligence reforms have 
addressed the key challenges that were identified in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it will 
be increasingly difficult to justify continued large appropriations to DHS and the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (IC).  And even if budgets for DHS remain stable, it will always 
be in the taxpayers’ interest to allocate money intelligently to the numerous and disparate 
functions within DHS.  If, as many argue, the IC still faces systemic problems collecting, 
analyzing, and sharing the right kind of intelligence for the post-9/11 age, then it would 
be unwise to put good money after bad and continue with a system that produces 
uncertain returns on the public dollar.  For this reason, a comprehensive analysis of the 
continuing challenges and shortcomings of the DHS Intelligence enterprise (DHSI) and 
the broader U.S. IC can be helpful in isolating those areas requiring greater congressional 
and executive attention going forward, which is what this paper will attempt to 
accomplish. 
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A. QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER 
The key questions at hand concern expectations vs. outcomes: 1) From the 
vantage of a decade after the creation of DHS, what does the evidence suggest about how 
closely the department today resembles the vision Congress had when it created the 
department a decade ago?  2) Likewise, in the context of the IC as a whole, to what extent 
have the evolution of the office of the DNI and the functioning of NCTC met the 
expectations laid out in the 9/11 Commission Report and the IRTPA for a more 
streamlined, less stove-piped IC?  3) If any of these post-9/11 domestic intelligence 
reforms have exhibited shortcomings, where are they most noticeable, and what can be 
done to address them? 
In a number of key respects, the path from enactment of legislation to 
implementation of effective intelligence reforms has been a rocky one, both for DHS and, 
to a slightly lesser extent, the broader IC.  One of the challenges in proving this is the 
near impossibility of determining national security returns on the billions of dollars that 
have been spent on DHS and the IC over the last decade.  One compelling argument that 
DHS and the IC have done an effective job since 9/11 is the simple fact that there have 
been no repeats of 9/11.  But this assessment ignores the near-misses of December 2009 
(the thwarted “underwear bombing” of a Detroit-bound airplane) and May 2010 (failed 
car bombing of Times Square). 
These close calls are symptomatic of a structural deficiency in DHS and the IC 
that still leaves doubt about who is ultimately accountable for domestic intelligence 
performance in this country and how effectively the vast quantities of collected 
intelligence can be fused.  The implementation of reforms at DHS has been a particularly 
slow and difficult process to get to the ultimate realization of a DHSI that is fully 
integrated with its numerous customers, including Congress, other members of the IC, 
other cabinet-level departments, the military, private business, and most importantly, 
state and local authorities at the fusion center level.  Similarly, at the DNI level, there 
persists a sense that the office’s portfolio is too large and expansive for one individual to 
coordinate all the diverse array of activities that the IC undertakes on a daily basis. 
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B. A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING AREAS OF CONTINUING 
CHALLENGE IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
The scholarly debate on this topic can be broken down into essentially three 
camps: 1) In the first camp, a fairly vocal collection of scholars and commentators sees 
the evolution of DHSI and the IC following the landmark reforms of roughly a decade 
ago as significantly lacking, having accomplished very little in the way of addressing key 
intelligence deficiencies that were identified in the wake of 9/11.  2) In a second camp, a 
slightly smaller but very dedicated group of primarily former civil servants makes the 
argument that DHSI and the IC have gone a long way toward remedying the glaring post-
9/11 problems in the community by enhancing information flows and providing a more 
extensive overarching structure to deal with the asymmetric threat.  3) In a third camp, a 
number of objective governmental and non-partisan reports, as well as Congressional 
testimony from members of the domestic intelligence establishment, suggests that despite 
progress in key areas, problems do remain.  This third body of work serves as a sort of 
tie-breaker, shifting the balance of the arguments to the side of the skeptics of 
intelligence reform and painting a picture of a national intelligence system that is still 
largely in flux. 
Amy Zegart stands as one of the most vocal critics of the IC’s performance both 
before and after 9/11 and her observations provide a helpful baseline against which to 
measure the IC’s progress in fixing the systemic problems that plagued it leading up to 
the 9/11 attacks.  A good place to start when analyzing DHSI and the IC as a whole is to 
examine those areas that Zegart says were most lacking in the run-up to 9/11: 1) the IC’s 
“lack of coherence or ‘corporateness,’” 2) insufficient “attention to setting intelligence 
priorities,” 3) the “need to revitalize human intelligence capabilities,” and 4) “personnel 
and information sharing issues.”1 
Interestingly, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland 
Security on May 12, 2010, Caryn Wagner, then Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
                                                 
1 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 35–38. 
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for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), pointed out three of the primary areas she was 
focused on at the time, which all appear to overlap the areas of concern highlighted by 
Zegart.  The areas Wagner mentioned included the need to enhance information sharing 
by focusing on fusion centers, the need to tailor DHS’s intelligence products to the needs 
of its customers, and the need to manage the personnel system in a way that would 
professionalize DHS.2 
That the areas highlighted by Wagner hold much in common with those areas 
identified by Zegart bolsters the broader argument Zegart and others have made that what 
concerned us about the IC immediately after 9/11 should still concern us today.  The 
isolation of three common areas of concern—what, for the purposes of this thesis, will be 
termed intelligence fusion, institutional evolution, and intelligence prioritization—will 
form the basis of the following chapters’ examination of the continuing challenges 
experienced by DHSI and the broader IC since the post-9/11 intelligence reforms were 
enacted by Congress. 
Since the overarching goal of this thesis will be to examine how well DHSI and 
its peers within the IC are performing in light of the significant reforms of a decade ago, 
it makes sense to organize the thesis along functional lines.  Consolidating the 
observations of Zegart and Under Secretary Wagner on the areas of greatest concern for 
DHSI and the IC as a whole, three primary functional intelligence areas emerge as the 
guideposts by which DHSI and the IC’s performance since 9/11 will be measured: 
1) intelligence fusion, which will be defined as the extent to which the domestic 
intelligence system is capable of integrating the flows of information on numerous levels 
(federal, state, local, etc.) in an effort to provide refined end-user intelligence for senior 
policymakers; 2) institutional evolution, defined as the degree to which new and evolving 
agencies within the domestic intelligence system are effective not only in leveraging their 
personnel in the efficient use of available manpower, but also in working with other 
agencies to achieve tangible homeland security successes; and 3) intelligence 
                                                 
2 A DHS Intelligence Enterprise: Still Just a Vision or Reality? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, 
111th Cong. (May 12, 2010), 10. 
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prioritization, defined as the ability of domestic intelligence analysts at the micro-level 
and domestic intelligence bureaucracies at the macro-level to effectively hone in on 
information most relevant to the homeland security mission in a way that produces 
maximum results with minimally duplicative effort. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The following chapters will consist of a primarily historiographic approach to the 
problem of evaluating the performance of the U.S. domestic intelligence system since the 
attacks of 9/11, which is to say primary and secondary source material will be marshaled 
as evidence in the construction of a narrative about the last ten years of intelligence 
reforms.  Such an approach has its benefits as well as its limitations.  On the one hand, 
contemporary experts and practitioners speak in their own words about their view of the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the domestic intelligence system through such source 
material as congressional testimony, RAND analyses, Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) findings, inspector general (IG) investigations, Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) reports, and scholarly research.  On the other hand, the use of historiography as a 
driving methodology admittedly lacks the hard quantifications inherent in a more social 
science-oriented approach, meaning that this thesis makes no pretense of constructing its 
argument with the help of organically produced hard data to back up its claims. 
Rather, this thesis seeks to harness the words and research done by others more 
prominent in the field in order to tell a story about the direction of intelligence reform in 
this country.  Nevertheless, the material drawn upon in the following chapters does 
manage to provide empirical evidence of its own: For example, only nine of 50 state 
fusion centers establishing Standing Information Needs (SINs) after several years of 
effort, a 55 percent contractor workforce at DHS years after its establishment, and 72 
percent of aviation stakeholders having not heard of DHS’ primary intelligence 
dissemination portal for threats to transportation infrastructure, to name just a few 
examples. (Each of these examples and more will be discussed in further depth and 
contextualized in the following chapters.) 
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D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of a total of five chapters, with introductory and concluding 
chapters and one chapter focusing on each of the three functional areas described above.  
In addition to the three chapters examining DHSI and the IC’s performance in these core 
functional areas since the major post-9/11 intelligence reforms, the concluding chapter 
will briefly explore alternatives for consideration as policymakers wrestle with how best 
to continue to improve the return on taxpayers’ homeland security dollars. 
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II. DHS, THE IC, AND FUSION: ONGOING CHALLENGES 
TO INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION 
The failure to fuse the information available to numerous agencies in the lead-up 
to the 9/11 attacks constitutes one of the most significant recent failures of the domestic 
intelligence system.  Excerpts from the 9/11 Commission Report detail concrete instances 
in which the FBI and CIA had relevant information about the 9/11 plotters that—if 
properly integrated—might have led to effective action by intelligence and law 
enforcement authorities to interrupt the plot before its culmination.  A closer examination 
of the state of play today, 11 years after the 9/11 attacks, reveals an intelligence apparatus 
still seeking answers to that elusive fusion challenge.  Significant challenges remain 
despite the monumental time, money, and effort that have been put toward enhancing the 
fusion of information into usable intelligence. 
This chapter will examine four areas that stand out as presenting particularly 
vexing problems for DHS and the IC as a whole in their efforts to foster more effective 
intelligence fusion today: 1) the scale and diversity of the customer-base requiring 
intelligence support; 2) the occasional failure of intelligence components, particularly 
within DHS, to provide a distinct value-added to the information they distribute to their 
customers; 3) the lack of comprehensive, well-publicized databases for customers to 
reference for integrated threat data; and 4) the peculiar irony within the IC that along with 
the surge in hiring of young analysts who are particularly adept at networking, 
collaborating, and sharing information comes a workforce that lacks the depth of 
experience to fuse the vast amounts of data being collected as effectively as their more 
knowledgeable, and retiring, veteran colleagues. 
While none of these challenges are insurmountable, they do represent significant 
roadblocks to the IC achieving the level of seamlessness and efficiency that the authors of 
the DHS and IRTPA legislation envisioned. And with constant reminders by 
commentators, experts, and policymakers alike that the next devastating attack could 
come at any moment, these kinds of delays in the IC’s ability to crack the fusion problem 
do matter.  Solving the critical problem of learning how to better fuse information into 
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actionable intelligence in an age when data fly across the fibers at accelerating rates is in 
DHS and the IC’s interest and deserves continued focused attention if another 
catastrophic attack on the scale of 9/11 is to be avoided. 
A. THE CHALLENGES OF BEING ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE 
Any cursory look at the DHS Intelligence enterprise’s numerous masters reveals 
the picture of a daunting set of customers with an incredibly diverse set of intelligence 
needs.  Under Secretary Wagner put it best in testimony before Congress shortly after 
assuming her role as the Chief Intelligence Officer within DHS: “After three months on 
the job, I can say I have never been in an organization that has the broad range of 
customers and requirements that I&A does. We are responsible for supporting the 
Secretary and senior Departmental leadership, the diverse set of DHS operational 
components, the state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, other federal 
partners, and also the intelligence community.”3  In a prepared statement that 
accompanied this testimony, Wagner also highlighted the diverse array of analytical 
efforts undertaken by the DHS Intelligence enterprise, including threat analysis and 
warning in the fields of counter-terrorism, infrastructure protection, border and 
immigration security, cyber security, health intelligence, and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) developments.4 
In light of this combination of such a disparate group of intelligence customers 
with such a wide-ranging set of intelligence focus areas, it is fair to ask whether genuine 
fusion can exist in such a context.  According to a DHS IG report examining efforts 
within the department to coordinate on information sharing issues with state and local 
fusion centers, “The term ‘fusion’ refers to the overarching process of managing the flow 
of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and private 
industry, and through analysis, provides meaningful intelligence.”5  Given this definition, 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, DHS’ Efforts To 
Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers, OIG-12-10, November 
2011, 2. 
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the primary challenge confronting DHS in particular is that the customer-base and 
mission set were so big to begin with and have only grown larger, to the point where 
effective fusion in certain areas has become an ideal that may not be realistically 
attainable.  For example, DHS recently made a push to become the primary agency in the 
evolving cyber security mission.  But given the fact that the department continues to 
wrestle with meeting its core competencies in the terrorism and critical infrastructure 
domains, does it make sense for the Executive to invest such faith in a nascent DHS to 
effectively fuse the complex information on cyber threats, especially when military 
agencies like the National Security Agency appear to have a firmer grasp of this rapidly 
evolving field? 
Charles Allen, the former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for I&A and a 
highly respected intelligence practitioner in Washington circles, holds a view of the DHS 
Intelligence enterprise as essentially an enormous vacuum of information generated by 
the myriad daily interactions conducted under DHS auspices every day.  In a speech to 
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 2008, Allen made a compelling case for 
the growing importance of DHS in the conduct of homeland security intelligence 
functions: 
Intelligence is not only about spies and satellites. It is about the thousands 
and thousands of routine, everyday observations and activities. 
Surveillance, interactions—each of which may be taken in isolation as not 
a particularly meaningful piece of information—but when fused together, 
gives us a sense of the patterns and the flow that really is at the core of 
what intelligence analysis is all about. What you may not know is that we, 
at DHS, actually generate a great deal of intelligence. We are virtually an 
“information factory” producing data based on thousands of interactions 
every hour at the border, in airports, and with the US Coast Guard.6 
People like Allen deserve an immense amount of credit for being at the forefront 
of DHS’s transition from a bureaucratic newcomer to a player on the IC stage.  The job of 
the early DHS leadership in this regard has been far from easy.  But for such a veteran 
                                                 
6 Charles Allen, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for Homeland Security,” 




intelligence operative, Allen makes a key mistake by interchangeably using the words 
“information” and “intelligence” when describing DHS’s unique niche. 
Contrary to his intent, Allen’s description of what DHS does with the vast 
amounts of data it collects serves to muddy the waters in the perception of how I&A and 
other members of the DHS Intelligence enterprise are able to effectively fuse this data 
into polished intelligence.  Allen paints a picture of DHS as being very good at 
collection—sucking up the vast and disparate array of information out there on 
everything from border crossing interactions to airport screenings to Coast Guard 
boardings of merchant vessels.  But it is one thing to collect and store this kind of data, 
while it is another thing entirely to apply the rigorous analysis necessary to convert this 
data into something that can be regarded as genuine intelligence.  This is where the DHS 
Intelligence enterprise has failed thus far and still has a long way to go.  The essential 
fusion required to turn information into intelligence is still not present at a scale sufficient 
to the task—in other words, DHS’s analytical and fusion capabilities have not caught up 
with its collection capability.  This is a problem and has implications not only for DHS’s 
effectiveness in preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack, but also for its perception 
by the public as an entity that threatens privacy and civil liberties with all this data that is 
collected, sometimes to no apparent use. 
B. PROVIDING VALUE-ADDED TO THE INTELLIGENCE CUSTOMER 
A noticeable lack of value-added inevitably stems from an insufficiently 
developed fusion capability, and this has been shown to often be the case in DHS 
interactions with its customers in the federal, state, tribal, local, and private domains.  In 
some cases, DHS Intelligence components have failed not only in terms of the relevance 
of the information they have distributed to their customers, but also in terms of the 
perennial push-pull conundrum, in which agencies with pertinent information often fail to 
push that information to those who may need it, instead waiting for the pull from the 
customer, who often does not know the information is there to be had in the first place.  
Todd Masse, in his 2006 CRS study of homeland security intelligence, illustrates this 
point well: 
 11 
Numerous fusion center officials claim that although their center receives 
a substantial amount of information from federal agencies, they never 
seem to get the “right information” or receive it in an efficient manner. 
According to many state fusion center leaders, often-pertinent threat 
intelligence must be requested by fusion centers, rather than federal 
agencies being proactive in providing it. The obvious difficulty arises 
regarding the inability to request relevant threat information that is 
unknown to members of the fusion center.7 
While this area has received a significant amount of attention from I&A’s 
leadership since 2006 and improvements on the federal-state collaboration front have 
been made, Masse’s observation continues to find a degree of resonance to this day.  In 
some cases, interactions between DHS Intelligence enterprise components and their 
public and private customers are still characterized by a confused dissemination scheme 
and an occasional lack of value-added in the information that is disseminated.  
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) interactions with its intelligence customer 
base in the transportation sector provide a primary case in point. 
In a November 2011 survey of stakeholders in the aviation, rail, and highway 
sectors, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sought to determine the extent to 
which customers were happy with the intelligence support received from TSA on 
emerging threats to the transportation sector and the ease with which that information 
could be retrieved.  While the survey found a general level of satisfaction with the 
support received, some noticeable observations about the “actionability” of the 
information received and challenges associated with finding that information were 
revealed.  In a telling passage, the GAO authors pinpoint a key concern of some of the 
stakeholders who opted to provide additional comments in their survey responses: 
Open-ended comments collected in our survey from 18 of the 275 
stakeholders provided additional context about actionability. For example, 
6 aviation stakeholders reported that informational reports, specifically the 
TSIRs  [Transportation Suspicious Incidents Reports]—which TSA 
phased out and replaced with the more regionally focused GRID [Global 
and Regional  Intelligence Digest] in August 2011—would be more 
                                                 
7 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Intelligence: 
Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, by Todd Masse, CRS Report RL33616 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 18, 2006), 28. 
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beneficial if they provided actionable information or additional guidance 
that would allow the stakeholders to adjust security measures or take other 
necessary actions to improve their security postures, and also identify 
ongoing trends to various sectors. One passenger air carrier official 
commented that these reports are ambiguous—often leaving him 
wondering what information may affect his airline and what changes 
should or could be made to directly counter specific threats.8 
TSA’s shortcomings in its effort to disseminate threat information to the operators 
of transportation networks gets to the heart of the challenges associated with fusion.  As 
these stakeholders clearly demonstrate in their comments, effective fusion would provide 
the distinct value-added that would allow them to do their jobs better and more easily 
comprehend their operating environment.  But in too many cases, not only in the TSA 
context but in other sectors and levels of government as well, DHS has been prone to 
disseminating raw information with the expectation that this alone with “scratch the itch” 
of its customers, so to speak.  Plainly speaking, this falls short of fusion.  To merely make 
information available to a customer base does not satisfy the intent of the legislation that 
created DHS in the first place.  Intelligence professionals get paid to provide their spin on 
the tangle of often indecipherable information floating around out there, and when they 
fail to do that, to fuse the information into actionable intelligence, they fail to do their 
job. 
C. THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DISSEMINATING AND 
COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE 
Of course, even after tackling the problem of fusing information into finished 
intelligence, there remains the challenge of getting that intelligence to those who are best 
placed to use it in a timely and efficient manner.  This represents another challenge that 
DHS and the broader IC continue to wrestle with long after the fevered pitch of reform 
that ensued immediately after 9/11.  An analysis of information sharing reveals that even 
with a change of culture taking root, the technical mechanisms for implementing a more 
information sharing-friendly environment continue to confound those with the best of 
intentions on this front. 
                                                 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Transportation Security Information Sharing: Stakeholders 
Generally Satisfied but TSA Could Improve Analysis, Awareness, and Accountability (November 2011), 15. 
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Staying with the TSA example just discussed, a secondary problem identified in 
the GAO survey has to do with the fact that many of TSA’s customers in the 
transportation industry did not necessarily know where to look to find threat intelligence.  
As the GAO authors point out, the Homeland Security Information Sharing Network 
Critical Sectors portal (HSIN-CS) was to be the main means of disseminating intelligence 
such as TSA’s threat reporting, with DHS regarding HSIN-CS as “the primary 
information-sharing mechanism for critical infrastructure sectors, including the 
transportation sector,” allowing for “information sharing and collaboration between the 
federal, state, local, and private sectors engaged in the homeland security mission.”9  Yet, 
as the report also notes, “almost 60 percent (158 of 266) of transportation stakeholders 
we surveyed had never heard of HSIN-CS,” with the surprising revelation that within the 
aviation sector alone, “72 percent of aviation stakeholders (124 of 173) responding to the 
survey had not heard of HSIN-CS and 9 percent (15 of 173) were unsure, and several 
commented that they would be interested in accessing the system.”10  On the issue of 
dissemination, the report logically concludes, “Because many transportation stakeholders 
have not heard of HSIN-CS, do not access the system, or encounter difficulties once they 
log in, they may not be receiving timely information via the information-sharing 
mechanism that DHS has established.”11 
DHS does not face these issues of intelligence dissemination and coordination 
alone.  The issue of how to integrate myriad information systems and databases continues 
to plague the IC as a whole, even though passage of the IRTPA ostensibly augured a new 
era of intelligence collaboration devoid of stove-pipes.  While the work of previous 
Directors of National Intelligence (DNI) like Dennis Blair and others has gone a long 
way toward changing the culture within the IC toward one more amenable to information 
sharing, the technical challenge involved in getting databases to talk to one another is 
quite complex. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 23–24. 
10 Ibid., 24–25. 
11 Ibid., 32. 
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Perhaps nowhere has this challenge been more evident than at NCTC, which has 
grown by reputation to be regarded as the primary nerve center for counterterrorism-
related intelligence.  As such, NCTC must be capable of synthesizing vast amounts of 
data from agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), not to mention all of the subcomponents within the federal, 
state, and local apparatus that have a counterterrorism focus.  An article in the Los 
Angeles Times in 2010 indicated that several years after NCTC’s inception as part of the 
IRTPA legislation, officials continued to struggle to patch together the complex mosaic 
of information that is constantly being collected: 
There are no easy legislative or technical fixes, said Russell E. Travers, 
information sharing chief at the National Counterterrorism Center. The 
agency is pursuing solutions that will allow automated connection of 
related information across databases, but “my guess is that this will be a 
challenge into perpetuity, because we get more and more information 
every day,” he said. One intelligence agency alone gets 8,000 terrorism 
messages each day with 11,000 to 15,000 names, he said.12 
This gets to the issue of what Under Secretary Wagner refers to as the “signal to 
noise” problem and the challenges it poses to the fusion of information into user-friendly 
intelligence.  As she noted to members of Congress, “I think the chief obstacle to 
horizontal integration tends to be, in the intelligence community side at least, what we 
call sort of signal to noise, which is not so much connecting the dots, but the fact that 
there is so much fragmentary information that it is very difficult to know at the time, until 
something happens to give you sort of hindsight, which of those pieces of information are 
significant enough to follow up on.”13 
Like NCTC, DHS’s I&A must try to find ways to incorporate all of the diverse 
data collected in its wide net that Charlie Allen likened to a veritable DHS “information 
factory.”  Without such capabilities, fusion does not happen and that data just sits there.  
That kind of arrangement may be closer to the norm for law enforcement authorities who 
                                                 
12 Ken Dilanian, “U.S. Counter-Terrorism Agents Still Hamstrung by Data-Sharing Failures,” Los 
Angeles Times, October 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/04/nation/la-naw-terrorism-data-
100510. 
13 DHS Intelligence Enterprise, 21. 
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can methodically sift through that information in an attempt to build a case, but for 
practitioners of homeland security intelligence, it has to have predictive quality in order 
to be relevant.  An article posted on the Homeland Security News Wire in late 2011 
discussed an initiative that DHS is pursuing in an effort to find that common solution to 
its unwieldy data problem.  Since the current system restricts data to “individual systems 
within various DHS components which were created to fulfill specific 
mission requirements,” officials have turned to the concept of “an integrated database 
known as the ‘Federated Information Sharing System’” with the goal of improving 
information sharing within the department.14 
While this could potentially go some distance toward managing the unruly 
treasure trove of data DHS collects each and every day and perhaps aid in the effort to 
more effectively fuse that data, the department runs up against another concern that has 
dogged it since the creation of a Department of Homeland Security was merely being 
discussed in the wake of 9/11: the protection of civil liberties.  Disregarding the 
enormous technical complexities involved in the creation of such an integrated database, 
the civil liberties issues are as relevant today as they were ten years ago.  As the article 
further points out: 
The ACLU also asked Secretary Napolitano what measures would be 
taken to restrict information on innocent people. DHS currently collects a 
vast amount of data, including benefit information from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), traveler information from CBP 
and TSA, naturalization records from USCIS, and personal information 
like social security number, date of birth, and email address from a wide 
variety of sources.15 
Complementing the more basic question of whether DHS is capable of fusing the 
vast array of data it collects is the equally important ethical question of whether it should 
fuse that data.  Regardless of technological developments in the future that may make it 
increasingly easy for the DHS Intelligence enterprise to do its job of all-source fusion in 
                                                 
14 “Concern over DHS move to create giant information databank,” Homeland Security News Wire, 




defense of the homeland, this key question on intrusion of civil liberties will complicate 
the department’s efforts for the foreseeable future. 
D. THE YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON ANALYSIS 
After taking into account challenges associated with satisfying a vast and diverse 
intelligence customer base, targeting the right information to the right people at the right 
time, and collaborating and integrating information in a way that incorporates small bits 
of data into a more digestible big picture, the remaining hurdle in the effort to achieve a 
more comprehensive fusion comes in the form of the analytical effort that gets applied at 
the end of the chain.  Similar to the discussion above regarding DHS’s occasional failings 
to provide value-added in the intelligence it disseminates to its customers, issues of 
analytical effort center on the ability of intelligence components throughout the IC to 
identify the key patterns and anomalies in information that are going to help their 
policymaking masters make difficult decisions.  In this area, too—particularly at the 
national, IC-wide level—effective fusion of information into end-user intelligence suffers 
some key challenges, one of which is the significant level of hiring that took place in the 
post-9/11 intelligence surge, leading to a significantly younger workforce of intelligence 
analysts throughout the IC today. 
Without question, the status quo leading up to the 9/11 attacks failed.  Analysts 
who had been working for 20 and 30 years in the IC studying threats emanating from the 
Soviet sphere were in many cases ill-equipped to shift their focus to the rapidly evolving 
threat from violent Islamic extremists.  And perhaps the most pernicious legacy of the 
Cold War years in the IC was the tendency for agencies and their analysts to guard their 
own turf, fearful of the loss of information that was deemed proprietary to a degree.  
Senior intelligence leadership at the highest levels seems to have gotten the message loud 
and clear from the 9/11 Commission and others that the old practice of stonewalling on 
vital issues of intelligence collaboration is intolerable in the face of an agile terrorist 
threat. 
To this end, former DNI Blair and other leaders within the community have 
successfully pushed initiatives that have helped replace the entrenched culture of secrecy 
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with one of openness and dialogue not only between intelligence agencies, but between 
individual analysts as well.  As Blair himself pointed out in a Washington Post op-ed, 
“Thousands of analysts form groups spontaneously, in real time, on A-Space, post 
insights in Intellipedia, retrieve relevant analyses from the Library of National 
Intelligence and interact with the tribal database for Afghanistan. These tools, among 
others, ensure that each piece of analysis takes advantage of work being done and that 
new insights are immediately available to those who need them.”16  This cultural shift 
within the IC should not be underestimated and represents a significant improvement on 
pre-9/11 practices. 
But greater sharing and collaboration alone will not achieve greater fusion per se, 
and the change in age demographics of the intelligence workforce over the last ten years 
has introduced a new challenge to effective fusion, notwithstanding the strides made in 
virtual integration through the use of such tools as A-Space, Intellipedia, and the like.  
Robert Cardillo puts the importance of this more recent youth movement in perspective: 
Our workforce is forcing us to change. Almost a quarter of the DIA 
Directorate for Analysis workforce is 30 years old or younger. Whether 
we believe in generalizations about the generations or not, we have to 
acknowledge that those who have grown up with the Internet are used to 
having information available at their fingertips, collaborating online, and 
networking as a way of life. We baby boomers in leadership have been 
able to keep up with them, though barely, with technology that leverages 
these strengths.17 
Cardillo, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration, 
is quite high on this change in the workforce.  Embracing the fact that the “newest 
generation of analysts brought on during this last decade knows no other way” than to 
integrate in an intensely collaborative environment, he argues that the DNI is leading a 
cultural change within the broader IC.18 
                                                 
16 Dennis C. Blair, “Strengthening Our Front Line of Defense,” Washington Post Op-Ed, December 
18, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-12-18/news/36806239_1_intelligence-reform-
intelligence-agencies-national-intelligence. 
17 Robert Cardillo, “Intelligence Community Reform: A Cultural Evolution,” Studies in Intelligence 
54 (2010): 4. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
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While IC-wide collaboration is the wave of the future and veteran analysts and 
leaders need to accept rather than resist this inevitability, the craft of intelligence 
analysis—whereby an oftentimes overwhelming amount of data is fused together into a 
more comprehensible understanding of a given problem—necessitates that greater 
collaboration alone cannot be an end in itself.  In an age of smart phones and Wi-Fi-
connected tablets that give the user instant access to a large volume of information 
anytime, an individual’s ability to effectively process all of that information has only 
become more challenging.  The fact that today’s consumer typically enjoys greater access 
to raw information than ever before does not automatically equate to the ability to make 
sense of it, and in this sense, the IC might be heading down a similar path to society at 
large.  Despite IC leadership pushing buzzwords like “integration” and “collaboration,” 
the art of intelligence fusion runs the risk of getting lost in the shuffle.  While many 
veteran analysts were caught off-guard by the developments of 9/11, their skill-sets 
should still be valued.  Learning how to fuse information and turn it into useful 
intelligence for policymakers often requires a significant amount of time simply sitting in 
an analyst’s chair and being exposed daily to the ebbs and flows of international affairs 
and large volumes of intelligence reporting.  While the younger generation of analysts 
undeniably possesses the collaborative tools and mindsets to push fusion forward in many 
key respects, those analysts still have a significant amount of on-the-job learning to do to 
become expert at the process of comprehensive fusion.  That simply takes time and 
exposure to long-running global trends and no amount of technological prowess can 
make up for that fundamental fact. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Fusion constitutes the vital final step in the process of converting mere 
information into predictive intelligence that can effectively inform important matters of 
policymaking.  Despite the four primary challenges to fusion detailed above, the DHS 
Intelligence enterprise and the Intelligence Community as a whole have made strides in 
addressing deep-seated shortcomings that were identified in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11.  The culture among many intelligence agencies has changed to one of more 
interconnectedness and an open exchange of information, and DHS has grown and 
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adapted since its inception to place a greater focus on supporting its myriad customers 
through the freer, yet more targeted, dissemination of intelligence. 
However, there lingers an overarching sense that the DHS and IC architecture that 
has developed over the last decade still suffers from a large degree of fragmentation.  
DHS has taken measures to address numerous shortcomings raised by congressional 
subcommittees and GAO reports, but to a certain degree, the enormity of the task facing 
the good people working in the various DHS intelligence components just does not lend 
itself to an easy solution to the problem of effective intelligence fusion.  Likewise in the 
IC, a cultural shift is indeed occurring, but the vastness of the data to be collected and 
processed in an effort to never be caught off-guard again by a major terrorist attack is a 
daunting task that will only be made more difficult as the IC develops the means to 
collect yet more data. 
Simply put, fusion at the highest levels of the national intelligence apparatus 
down to the beat cop on the street continues to be a work in progress.  Part of the answer 
is that agencies with a stake in the homeland security mission need to continually refine 
their processes and procedures in order to get more adept at a counterterrorism mission 
that is still relatively new.  But part of the answer is also the requirement for more time 
for this vast new homeland security infrastructure to take root and form into a more 
seamless machine.  The key question obviously is whether the nation has time for this 
inevitable evolutionary process to play out.  With the exception of near-misses on a 
Detroit-bound airliner and at Times Square, the record is fairly strong thus far.  But time 
will tell whether DHS and the IC can meet the challenges facing them before the threat 
catches up, potentially forcing a serious reconsideration of how the country’s leaders 
have chosen to tackle these very complex problems of bureaucratic reform. 
This leads to consideration of the critical question of institutional evolution, 
which serves as the subject of the next chapter.  Ironically, in a race against time and the 
possibility of a dramatic follow-on attack by asymmetric forces who hope to do the 
United States homeland harm, history demonstrates that the kind of large-scale 
bureaucratic change initiated by the establishment of DHS and passage of the IRTPA 
does take significant time to come to fruition.  While there has been no lack of personal 
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effort by leaders and rank-and-file members of the IC alike to effect positive change, 
some signs point to the institutional evolution taking place within DHS and the IC as on 
more of marathon trajectory, rather than taking the form of a sprint, despite the urgency 
of the homeland security challenges faced. 
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III. INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN THE DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE SPHERE: A SLOW AND HALTING AFFAIR 
While the process of conceiving a new intelligence structure within the United States 
and then passing the related legislation to establish that structure occurred in a relatively 
condensed timeframe following the 9/11 attacks, the process of executing the mandates set 
forth in the legislation has been a work in progress for a solid decade.  It was one thing for 
representatives, senators, and White House aides to negotiate a statutory solution to the 
country’s apparent intelligence shortcomings; it has proven to be quite another task to 
effectively carry out the domestic counterterrorism intelligence reforms envisioned in the 
legislation creating DHS, as well as those reforms initiated by the IRTPA, which set out to 
usher in a new era of more clearly defined authority and responsibility vested in the DNI. 
As Amy Zegart points out, numerous commissions established prior to the 9/11 attacks 
to examine structural challenges facing the IC in the post-Cold War world found consensus 
around a core of issues, one of which was the obvious lack of “corporateness” within the IC.19  
The disjointedness stemming from this lack of “corporateness” appears to have been a major 
contributor to the intelligence failures surrounding the 9/11 attacks.  In an ideal world, the 
creation of DHS, with its homeland security intelligence component, in addition to the 
establishment of NCTC and the post of DNI under the IRTPA, would directly address this 
major deficiency. 
However, as numerous GAO reports, IG investigations, and exchanges before 
congressional subcommittees demonstrate, the road to achieving a more comprehensive level 
of accountability and integration among the agencies within both DHS and the broader IC has 
been a long and challenging one.  Much effort has been expended, and in numerous instances 
tangible progress made, but the evidence suggests that DHS and the IC find themselves in more 
of a marathon of bureaucratic evolution than a sprint to quick-fixes of long-standing 
intelligence challenges.  This chapter will examine in more depth the institutional evolutionary 
challenges faced by DHS and the IC.  The first half of the chapter will focus specifically on 
                                                 
19 Zegart, Spying Blind, 35. 
 22 
DHS issues, followed by a broader examination of the IC’s challenges in this area, and 
concluding with an analysis of what the current state of evolutionary change is within the 
domestic intelligence system as a whole. 
A. SEARCHING FOR CLEARER DIRECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
WITHIN DHS 
In his opening statement at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Ranking Member, Representative Mike Thompson, commented that “DHS’ 
place in the U.S. intelligence architecture has been a topic of congressional oversight since its 
creation and remains a work in progress without final resolution.”20  The phrase “work in 
progress” probably best describes the status of organizational evolution within DHS.  
Conceptually, a strong, independent DHS intelligence element acting as a vital conduit between 
federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement entities makes a lot of intuitive sense.  
The real challenges, of course, have come in the execution of this vision over the last decade. 
A key word that surfaces again and again in the literature on DHS’s integration efforts 
is “accountability.”  How to foster accountability within an organization that is the newest 
bureaucratic player in the high-tempo, high-stakes world of homeland security 
counterterrorism?  One of the primary forces hampering accountability within DHS is the sheer 
complexity of the bureaucratic evolution that occurred in the first place.  As the authors of the 
National Security Preparedness Group’s Tenth Anniversary Report Card point out: 
Over the past 10 years, our government’s response to the challenge of  
transnational terrorism has been dramatic. At the federal level, we have 
created major new institutions. The Department of Homeland Security 
itself was a massive reconfiguration of government, combining 22 
agencies into a new department, with a workforce of 230,000 people and 
an annual budget of more than $50 billion. In total, some 263 
organizations have been established or redesigned.21 
                                                 
20 The Role of DHS in the IC: A Report by the Aspen Institute. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 112th Cong. (January 18, 2012), 1. 
21 National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 9/11 
Commission Recommendations (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2011), 6. 
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In an important respect, the concentration of a disparate collection of mission-sets 
under the DHS umbrella achieved what some critics advocated for in the weeks and 
months following the 9/11 attacks: a full-fledged effort to wrangle together diverse 
elements within the domestic security sphere in an attempt to compel them to work as 
one. 
But as Charles Perrow observes, this kind of concentration of such a wide array of 
focus areas ran the risk of muddling the picture, which served as a significant 
bureaucratic challenge for DHS’s early leadership from the start: “The new department 
merged agencies that, along with their security roles, had responsibilities for such 
activities unrelated to terrorism as fisheries, river floods, animal diseases, energy 
reliability, computer crime, citizenship training, tariffs on imports, drug smuggling, and 
the reliability of telephone networks. The potpourri of unrelated activities was to exceed 
that of any previous large government mergers.”22 
While this was certainly not a fatal flaw, it has had implications that reverberate 
to this day, which is where the accountability issue comes into play.  One of the 
consequences of such an abrupt consolidation of previously-unrelated functions under a 
new cabinet-level department has been the uneven pace of bureaucratic evolution across 
DHS’s 22 component agencies.  Within DHS’ wide-ranging family of agencies exists a 
more staid organization like the Coast Guard, whose long tradition and solid 
establishment within the federal bureaucracy stands in stark contrast to the newly-
established TSA, which in terms of institutional evolution is still in the process of 
establishing its Beltway credentials, not to mention its basic business practices and links 
with other federal agencies, both inside and outside of DHS. 
As one of six intelligence elements within the DHS Intelligence enterprise, TSA 
carries with it an important responsibility to remain integrated and relevant in DHS’s 
efforts to build a streamlined and effective network of cross-communicating 
organizations.  But as a GAO report recently revealed, TSA may be holding itself back 
from reaching its full organizational potential by failing to lay out its intelligence 
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responsibilities more clearly.  As the report notes, “Because TSA has not clearly 
defined and documented roles and responsibilities for disseminating security-
related information and the full range of its information-sharing efforts, TSA may 
not be consistently providing security-related information products to external 
stakeholders and divisions within TSA may not be held fully accountable for 
performing their information-sharing activities.”23  For a DHS subcomponent like 
TSA which is not formally part of the IC—in addition to its fellow 
subcomponents, including CBP, ICE, and the Secret Service—this definition of 
roles and responsibilities is vitally important to avoid misperceptions by outside 
agencies about just what DHS intelligence elements can and cannot do. 
The challenge of creating greater accountability in a bureaucracy such as 
DHS that is new and sprawling is not limited strictly to TSA.  Another GAO report 
focusing on the relationship between DHS’s I&A and state fusion centers 
recommends, “Defining and documenting the specific programs and activities 
I&A’s components and divisions will be held responsible for implementing so that 
I&A collectively can meet its state and local mission could help to establish clear 
direction and accountability.”24  Again, the accountability piece of the equation 
seems to suffer most when there is bureaucratic ambiguity over who is responsible 
for what.  What these reports and others find is that in many cases DHS and its 
components have been slow to define more clearly roles and responsibilities 
within their organizations, often leading to continued bureaucratic confusion 
nearly a decade after the department’s establishment.  These kinds of challenges 
were understandable in the first few years following the transition, but they are 
becoming less and less acceptable.  The outlining of roles and responsibilities in 
the service of creating a culture of accountability constitutes one of the 
fundamental tasks confronting an organization searching for its identity.  DHS’ 
progress in this regard has been notably slow. 
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As other evidence indicates, the general slowness with which DHS 
components have identified specific roles and responsibilities has had an adverse 
impact on organizations outside of DHS’s immediate sphere of influence.  A 
recent DHS IG report noted the continuing uncertainty on the part of state fusion 
centers with regard to what exactly DHS’s components can bring to the table by 
observing, “SLPO [State and Local Program Office] is also soliciting comments 
from fusion centers regarding which DHS components and federal departments 
and agencies they would find most useful in their centers. However, many fusion 
centers do not have a clear understanding of DHS components’ capabilities, 
missions, and information collection areas.”25  The report goes on to say, 
“Although DHS components are aware that cooperation with and support of fusion 
centers is a departmental priority, none of the component field staff we spoke with 
recalled seeing formal written instructions or guidelines for supporting fusion 
centers from their headquarters management.”26 
DHS’ I&A could help clarify areas where significant ambiguity over 
component capabilities and missions still exists, but even in those circumstances 
where DHS is providing adequate resources to the fusion centers, confusion at the 
state level can add to the problem as well.  Take, for example, the DHS 
Intelligence Officers (IO) who are assigned by DHS headquarters to the numerous 
fusion center locales.  In this regard, DHS has arguably done a satisfactory job of 
providing state fusion center leaders with a single point of contact with whom they 
can consult on issues relating to DHS-fusion center coordination.  What some of 
the literature points out, however, is that failure to properly define roles and 
responsibilities at the state level can have a detrimental effect on operations as 
well. 
The same DHS IG report, while identifying actions DHS headquarters can 
take to clear the muddy waters on this subject, also sees problems caused by the 
divergent ways fusion center leaders envision use of the IO position: 
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At some fusion centers, IO roles and responsibilities are unclear, causing 
misunderstandings among both DHS and fusion center staff. For example, 
some fusion center directors believed that IOs would train analysts or 
write analytical products, while other directors anticipated that their IOs 
would have expertise in specific topics of interest to the state, such as 
maritime or border issues. Defining roles and responsibilities would make 
relationships among IOs, components, and fusion center staff more 
productive and improve information sharing.27 
The primary risk being run here is that when areas of gray exist concerning which 
organization has responsibility for this or that part of the homeland security mission, 
ultimate accountability will be lost in the confusion.  This state of affairs then has the 
potential to bring the nation’s homeland security apparatus back to square one, to a pre-
9/11 environment where many people from many different organizations were working 
diligently on the counterterrorism/homeland security problem set, yet no clear seams 
demarcated where one agency’s responsibilities dropped off and another’s began. 
It would be hyperbole to state that shortcomings in domestic intelligence reform 
since 9/11 have brought the IC essentially back to where it started; that is not the intent of 
this thesis.  In fact, the creation of DHS, along with its continually developing 
intelligence capabilities, has established cross-links between federal, state, and local 
agencies that were nearly non-existent in some respects prior to the 9/11 attacks.  If 
nothing else, the introduction of DHS on the scene has motivated people in the 
community to talk to one another, with an awareness that resources exist at the national 
level for state and local authorities to draw upon.  This has been an important 
development over the last decade and will continue to mature and develop as time goes 
on. 
But it is prudent to ask where the seams still are not clear and where more can be 
done to further reduce ambiguity within the homeland security intelligence infrastructure.  
One way to identify which practices are having the intended effect and which are falling 
short would be a more rigorous implementation of performance measures.   But as the 
GAO has observed, some of the ambiguity that characterizes roles and relationships 
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within DHS and the state fusion centers also affects the way homeland security 
components grade themselves on how they’re doing, which has an adverse impact on 
fostering greater accountability: 
We also have recognized and reported that it is difficult to develop 
performance measures that show how certain information-sharing efforts 
have affected homeland security. Nevertheless, we have recommended 
that agencies take steps towards establishing such measures to hold them 
accountable for the investments they make. We also recognize that 
agencies may need to evolve from relatively easier process measures that, 
for example, count the number of products provided to more meaningful 
measures that weigh customer satisfaction with the timeliness, usefulness, 
and accuracy of the information provided, until the  agencies can establish 
outcome measures that determine what difference the information made to 
state or local homeland security efforts.28 
As suggested above, it is not enough to simply quantify how much production 
DHS components are generating.  Especially in the field of intelligence, this kind of 
quantification is near meaningless. Rather, DHS and its components will need to continue 
to develop their performance measures over time, so that their intelligence collection and 
analysis can become that much more focused.  These are understandable challenges for a 
fledgling bureaucracy with such a disparate mission set, but dealing with them properly 
and expeditiously is essential if DHS is going to create the kind of intelligence 
accountability the 9/11 Commission saw so clearly lacking in its analysis of pre-9/11 
events. 
One final obstacle to DHS creating the kind of culture of accountability it seeks 
stems from the somewhat transient nature of its workforce over the first decade of its 
existence.  As a congressional hearing in May 2010 revealed, DHS leadership has 
struggled to establish a workforce with the requisite degree of stability and permanence 
one might expect in a department so vital to national security.  Speaking on behalf of the 
Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, Representative Jane Harman, Chair 
of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, directed an important personnel question to Bart Johnson, principal deputy 
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under secretary of Homeland Security for I&A: “The second question that the chairman 
would have asked is about the use of outside federal contractors. I remember being 
appalled to learn that the ratio was 60/40, outside to inside, or maybe even worse. Mr. 
Johnson, you pledged eight months ago to help fix that. I think the goal was to get to 
40/60, which is still not terrific. Where are we?”29 
Under Secretary for I&A Caryn Wagner’s response is instructive in illustrating 
the myriad challenges DHS leadership has had to confront while building the foundations 
of a competent domestic intelligence capability.  Citing problems with obtaining Office 
of Personnel Management hiring authorities and the persistence of “too many vacant 
billets,” Wagner conceded that reduction of the contractor ranks within the DHS 
Intelligence enterprise was a slow process, resulting in a relatively small reduction from 
60 percent to 55 percent of the total workforce.30  In a line of work where analyzing 
threats to the homeland over a long period of time in order to identify big picture trends 
and subtle anomalies is of enormous importance, the presence of such a substantial 
contractor force counteracts that institutional drive toward stability and permanence that 
is so crucial in DHS’s early evolution.  It may seem like a relatively minor detail, but a 
workforce that is in flux and experiences the kind of turnover typical of temporary 
contract positions makes the issue of generating a viable culture of accountability all the 
more difficult.  DHS leadership has enough challenges in getting peer agencies and state 
and local component agencies to collaborate; the last thing they need is an ongoing 
struggle over the stability of their own personnel. 
B. CONTINUING ISSUES OF FRAGMENTATION WITHIN THE 
BROADER IC 
Just as DHS continues to suffer from ambiguities in roles and responsibilities, the 
IC suffers from a degree of fragmentation of its own that can lead to competition, 
multiplicity of effort, and ambiguous authority at the national level, as well.  Integrating 
the disparate capabilities of the IC in the service of greater homeland security has proven 
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to be a nuanced undertaking with a political element that has made breaking with historic 
norms of doing business particularly difficult.  What has resulted in some areas looks like 
an incoherent whole, much as Amy Zegart discusses in a pre-9/11 context in Spying 
Blind.  While progress has been made in certain key respects, longstanding issues of 
uncertainty over who is ultimately in charge at the national level remain. 
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the analytical realm.  As numerous 
observers point out, even today the IC appears to lack a comprehensive unity of effort in 
terms of counterterrorism/homeland security intelligence production.  Conducting a study 
for RAND and DHS in which he interviewed current and former homeland security 
experts concerning the structure of domestic intelligence in the United States, Gregory 
Treverton noted the common view among participants that domestic intelligence analysis 
is “fragmented and sometimes conflicting,” adding: 
At the federal level, individuals we spoke with during this study captured 
many of these concerns by posing the seemingly simple question—
“Where is the center of analytical capability for domestic counterterrorism 
intelligence efforts supposed  to be in the federal government?” NCTC is 
the central node for terrorism analysis at the federal level, but the main 
customer for its analytical efforts was characterized as “up”—the 
President—rather than “down”—the rest of the organizations involved in 
homeland security.31 
As Treverton points out, even in the case of NCTC, which many have seen as a 
big success since its creation under the IRTPA, uncertainty remains regarding what 
should be considered the proper center of gravity in the analytical effort.  If NCTC is 
serving the President well at the expense of greater local knowledge of the threat picture, 
the domestic intelligence architecture will still be prone to deficiencies.  The soon-to-be-
defunct Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG) was established to 
address this up-only orientation of NCTC by acting partly as an expeditor for state and 
local agencies to receive counterterrorism intelligence from NCTC, but there remains a 
continuing feeling by some that the world of counterterrorism intelligence is still 
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somewhat top-heavy and skewed more toward the decision makers in Washington at the 
expense of local authorities’ situational awareness. 
Treverton invokes a sports analogy from one of his study participants that 
resonates in other literature on the subject to make a broader point about the structural 
ambiguity that still remains at the national level: 
Some expert panel participants (and interviewees as well) were 
particularly critical of the complex structure of the current domestic 
intelligence enterprise, even at the federal level, let alone reaching out to 
the states and localities. One asserted that it has “no structure” and creates 
significant confusion for the domestic counterterrorism intelligence 
mission. Another described domestic intelligence as “a pickup ballgame 
without a real structure, leadership, management, or output.”32 
Part of the problem could stem from the fact that the general response by the federal 
government to the intelligence shortcomings evident in the successful 9/11 attacks was equal 
parts reorganization and resource augmentation.  This is an interesting feature of post-9/11 
intelligence reform at the national level because what the 9/11 Commission Report seemed to 
be saying is that venerated organizations like the FBI and CIA were on the right path leading 
up to the attacks, but their way of doing business was antiquated and more suited to a territorial 
Cold War mentality.  There did not appear to be a significant outcry for more resources per se, 
but the outcome seen in the immediate years following the 9/11 attacks was one of significantly 
more analysts devoted to the effort with the resulting increase in bureaucratic overhead and 
greater confusion over lines of authority. 
Robert Cardillo extends the sports analogy theme in his discussion of the historically 
competitive nature of the IC and the necessity for different elements of the community to focus 
on their core competencies rather than compete with one another for resources and visibility: 
We still work in a free-for-all environment: agencies are writing on what 
they want to write. We are still competing against one another on many 
issues, the proverbial kids’ soccer game. While competitive analysis is 
good to some degree,  we cannot afford to compete in everything. With 
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ever-expanding requirements and likely declining resources, we need to 
think now about how to task-organize ourselves better.33 
Cardillo and Treverton’s comparison of the U.S. domestic intelligence effort to a 
disorganized, jumbled ball game has some merit, primarily in terms of how it conveys a 
fundamental lack of stewardship by a central figure or body.  It helps the reader visualize 
the irony within domestic intelligence circles whereby there exist numerous agencies 
with enormous energy and level of effort, but at times pursuing different and occasionally 
contradictory agendas based upon the varied needs of their customer bases and the 
competing visions of their leadership.  It is precisely this state of affairs that has led to 
some consternation on the part of long-time practitioners who feel a sense of institutional 
aimlessness, even despite the significant inflow of resources over the last decade.  And as 
Cardillo points out, even that seemingly endless flow of resources can no longer be 
considered a permanent part of the budgetary landscape in these times of fiscal 
uncertainty. 
Theoretically, the IRTPA was supposed to address the challenges of a lack of 
ultimate accountability and lack of a central directing authority within the broader IC 
with the establishment of the post of DNI.  But as the Tenth Anniversary Report Card 
highlights, the DNI’s status within the IC constitutes one of the lingering areas deserving 
executive-level attention to remedy persistent confusion over big picture authority and 
direction: 
It still is not clear, however, that the DNI is the driving force for 
intelligence community integration that we had envisioned. Some 
ambiguity appears to remain with respect to the DNI’s authority over 
budget and personnel. Strengthening the DNI’s position in these areas 
would advance the unity of effort in intelligence, whether through 
legislation or with repeated declarations from the president that the DNI is 
the unequivocal leader of the intelligence community.34 
The report card’s emphasis on the need to more clearly designate the DNI as the 
President’s chief intelligence adviser is simply one of the more recent echoes of what 
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many in the community have been critiquing since passage of the IRTPA, namely, the 
continued fractured and disjointed state of the domestic intelligence architecture.  Former 
CIA officer and White House aide, Bruce Riedel, has commented, “You have a very 
large posse and no real sheriff running it.”35  A fellow former CIA officer, Henry 
Crumpton, echoes this view with his observation that “America relies on a deeply 
fractured and rudimentary domestic intelligence community, one that has growing but 
still insufficient links to the U.S. external intelligence systems.”36  And Luis Garicano 
and Richard Posner have detected “the sense that nobody is in charge,” asserting, “We 
have an unwieldy multiplicity of agencies that operate largely independently.”37  They 
capture a sense of institutional inertia predominating in the domestic intelligence sphere 
when they state, “The national intelligence apparatus of the U.S. has fewer employees 
than GM had in its prime, yet it consists officially of 16 separate agencies, and 
unofficially of more than 20. Each of these agencies is protected by strong political and 
bureaucratic constituencies, so that after each intelligence failure everything continues 
pretty much the same and usually with the same people in charge.”38 
The collective suggestion seems to be that the domestic intelligence apparatus is 
in need of a good floor manager, someone who has been granted unambiguous authority 
by Congress and the President to be the go-to person for accountability and strategic 
direction.  But as the current status of competing responsibilities and authorities persists, 
one gets the increasing sense that the U.S. intelligence system lacks the necessary rudder 
mechanism to maintain a focused course.  While new capabilities have been added since 
the 9/11 attacks and everyone has seemingly gotten the talking points down about 
working more collaboratively in defense of the homeland, the organizational evolution 
that was supposed to be ushered in by the creation of DHS and passage of the IRTPA has 
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been at times halting and occasionally hindered by legacy turf wars and the resistance by 
some to relinquishing bureaucratic power. 
Journalist Daniel Dombey illustrates this stunted institutional evolution well in his 
discussion of the bureaucratic turf war that ultimately led to former DNI Dennis Blair’s 
decision to step down from the post in May 2010: 
Part of the blame for the confusion may belong to legislators and the 
current administration. When the 9/11 commission proposed the position 
of director of national intelligence, it envisaged a clear hierarchy in which 
the CIA director would serve as the DNI’s number two. That never 
happened. Instead, the CIA remains an independent power base – a fact 
emphasized late last year when Mr. Obama sided with Mr. Panetta rather 
than Mr. Blair in a dispute over whether CIA station chiefs overseas, 
rather than representatives from other agencies, would always be the 
senior US intelligence officials in foreign countries.39 
As this passage touches on, in some respects passage of the IRTPA has not been 
as transformative as envisioned.  To a degree, this is about strong personalities within the 
Beltway who have shown an ability to engage in bureaucratic warfare with notable skill 
in the service of protecting the status quo.  But perhaps to a larger degree, the kind of 
institutional evolution envisioned by the sponsors of the IRTPA just takes a lot of time.  
The National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 are exhibits A 
and B in this regard.  Big, set-in-their-ways intelligence institutions are like glaciers, 
requiring not only tremendous political force to move, but also time—measured in 
decades, not months or years.  This has been perhaps the toughest reality for would-be 
intelligence reformers to confront: despite clear and cogent calls by the members of the 
9/11 Commission and others to truly remake the U.S. domestic intelligence structure, 
when push has come to shove, political considerations and long-standing bureaucratic 
rivalries have overshadowed the reform effort since 9/11. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of institutional evolution is a long-term one with deep historical 
precedents in the U.S. national security arena.  The legislation that created DHS and the 
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legislation that established NCTC and the DNI position have attempted to accomplish 
two distinct, but related, goals.  In the case of DHS, the overarching goal has been to 
redefine the parameters of the domestic intelligence effort within the U.S. government, 
whether officials choose to use the words “domestic” and “intelligence” in the same 
sentence or not.  This effort involved the introduction of a whole new structural design in 
the form of a new cabinet-level department incorporating 22 separate agencies that had 
existed independently or under different bureaucratic umbrellas prior to the advent of 
DHS. 
The IRTPA, on the other hand, attempted to do something wholly different but no 
less difficult.  Building largely on capabilities and institutions already in place within the 
IC, the IRTPA set about changing cultural norms by imposing what was supposed to be a 
new ultimate level of authority and accountability in the Office of the DNI.  It is hard to 
say which endeavor has been more challenging.  Getting agencies and individuals to 
better communicate with one another in the context of DHS has proven challenging 
because of the large number of moving parts and the addition of wholly new offices and 
positions of leadership.  Doing the same in the context of the DNI has proven challenging 
because of the decades of institutional inertia that had built up during the Cold War years. 
In each case, the lessons to be learned have been the same: such large 
transformations take time and one cannot reasonably expect instantaneous institutional 
responsiveness, given the magnitude of the challenge and the number of actors involved.  
But given the urgency of the problem—the critical drive to prevent a second 9/11 of 
potentially even greater destruction and disruptiveness—the question remains: Is there 
sufficient time to allow natural institutional evolution of the kind Americans have grown 
accustomed to over the years to take place?  The herculean efforts of the men and women 
on the front lines of the myriad DHS mission sets and the DHS and DNI leadership 
notwithstanding, the clock continues to tick. 
Certain metrics may suggest that the government is winning this battle against 
time and prevailing in the effort to prevent another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, but 
what seems a good track record over the last decade could be negated a day, a week, a 
month, or a year from now by a successful attack.  And in such a dreaded scenario, 
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people will ask whether the new institutions and ways of doing business that were 
ushered in under the landmark intelligence reforms discussed in this chapter sufficiently 
encapsulated the sense of urgency that was present in the warnings of the 9/11 
Commission and others.  My hope is that the pace of institutional reform in the U.S. 
domestic intelligence community has been sufficient to meet the terrorism challenge of 
the times, but I am concerned that the needed changes that were articulated in the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks continue to take too long to fully implement. 
One of the consequences of a homeland security infrastructure that continues to 
suffer from a significant degree of fragmentation is a lack of effective intelligence 
prioritization, which is the subject of the following chapter.  As efforts have been ramped 
up to collect greater and greater amounts of information about anything that may pertain 
to the security of the homeland, it has become imperative for DHS and the IC at large to 
do a better job of prioritizing those areas of greatest concern and targeting more precisely 
their collection and analysis efforts.  Hampered by a need to serve many different masters 
and a desire to demonstrate the ability to function in a wide array of emerging threat 
areas—including cyberspace, infrastructure protection, counternarcotics, and 
counterterrorism—DHS in particular has struggled with how best to prioritize where it 
allocates its resources so as to get the best bang for the buck.  At times it has seemed that 
the department has chosen a strategy of spreading itself thin over many different areas of 
homeland security concern rather than concentrating its efforts in a handful of core-
capability areas, which may emerge as a significant constraint on its ability to more 
effectively ensure domestic security in the future. 
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IV. JACK OF ALL TRADES, MASTER OF NONE?: 
CHALLENGES IN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIZATION 
Just as challenges associated with fusion and the slowness of institutional 
evolution have hampered efforts within both DHS and the broader IC to develop a more 
robust, seamless domestic intelligence infrastructure, so too has the issue of intelligence 
prioritization.  Intelligence prioritization comes in many forms, but for the purposes of 
this paper will be considered an organization’s ability to focus collection and analytical 
resources on those mission areas deemed within that organization’s core competency and 
which contribute in fundamental ways to the preservation of homeland security.  With 
this baseline in mind, a review of the diverse primary and secondary source literature 
over the past few years suggests that DHS and the IC continue to struggle with how best 
to not only divvy up domestic intelligence tasks and mission sets between agencies, but 
also how best to hone in on those more specific areas of focus requiring collection and 
analytical effort. 
This chapter will provide an examination of how DHS and the IC as a whole have 
struggled with intelligence prioritization—including challenges associated with mapping 
the domestic intelligence landscape and determining who is ultimately in charge—with 
analysis focusing on four particular areas: 1) the drawbacks of an increasingly popular 
shift toward taking an all-hazards approach; 2) an overemphasis on collection of 
information at the expense of complementary analysis; 3) a continuing lack of effective 
tools for measuring the success of targeted intelligence distribution to customers; and 4) 
the persistence of redundancies, ambiguities, and lost accountability that has resulted 
from overlapping mission sets between competing agencies. 
A. THE INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIZATION PROBLEM DEFINED 
Identifying intelligence prioritization as one of the core areas of 
underperformance to have emerged from a series of blue ribbon studies conducted 
throughout the 1990s examining the IC and the government’s counterterrorism efforts, 
Amy Zegart finds that, in the words of the President’s National Performance Review of 
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1993, “the system for establishing intelligence collection and analysis priorities [was] a 
‘jumble of loosely connected processes’ that did not satisfy the needs of policymakers.”40  
This apparent lack of an IC-wide system for establishing clear intelligence priorities was 
something that would need to be addressed in the series of post-9/11 intelligence reforms 
examined in this paper.  Ideally, the establishment of DHS and passage of the IRTPA 
would be seen to have instituted a prioritization process whereby the most important 
mission sets not only rose to the top of DHS and the IC’s agendas, but were then 
allocated among the different specialty agencies within the domestic intelligence system 
so as to de-conflict efforts and avoid redundancy. 
On the contrary, what appears to have occurred over the last decade is a kind of 
mashing up of resources and agency focus areas so that, with a few notable exceptions, 
intelligence prioritization within the homeland security community today is as elusive as 
it was in the post-Cold War/pre-9/11 interregnum.  Concerns raised by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission in the late 1990s over “dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of important 
countries, regions, and functional challenges” still largely ring true today.41  One of the 
main challenges has been the inability to take a significant influx of financial and human 
resources in the years immediately after the 9/11 attacks and evenly distribute them 
across the system so as to maximize their effectiveness in key areas of concern.  Instead, 
the prevailing philosophy around Washington since 9/11 has seemed to be that if you do 
more of everything—more collection, more analysis, more staff hiring—the security of 
the homeland will be better off for it.  But my view is that if you act in such a way where 
you are essentially prioritizing everything, in reality you end up prioritizing nothing. 
B. DRAWBACKS OF THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH 
As the country has gotten further away from the events of 9/11 in terms of both 
memory and time, the counterterrorism mission has begun to take a back seat in some 
local jurisdictions for which the terrorism threat has never appeared that clear and 
present.  As the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the 
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs recently pointed out in an 
examination of fusion centers, even the larger “statewide fusion centers and fusion 
centers in major cities indicate that they emphasize anti-crime efforts and ‘all-hazards’ 
missions over an explicit focus on counterterrorism.”42  This is an understandable 
adjustment by these fusion centers to the reality that the terrorist threat at home has not 
proven to be the all-consuming threat over time that had so gripped the nation’s psyche in 
the weeks and months immediately following the 9/11 attacks.  However, opening the 
fusion centers up to an all-hazards approach brings some perils of its own. 
As the PSI report further points out, a 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment 
conducted by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) 
indicated that terrorism had slid down the priority list of many fusion centers and been 
replaced by a myriad of assorted focus areas more purely criminal in nature: 
Most [fusion] centers focus on the priority mission of the law enforcement 
agency that owns/manages them; primarily analytical case support to drug, 
gang, and violent crime investigations for the geographic area of 
responsibility. As a result many centers struggle to build the necessary 
capabilities required to support Federal counterterrorism mission 
requirements, specifically in the areas of intelligence analysis and 
information sharing beyond their jurisdictions.43 
This atrophying of counterterrorism-related analytical and information sharing 
skills constitutes one of the more worrisome consequences of the shift to an all-hazards 
approach by many fusion centers.  While the fusion center directors cannot be faulted for 
looking for the best ways to leverage the resources available to them to tackle the most 
important issues in their regions—like drugs and gang violence—this trend does 
nevertheless serve as a notable deviation from the original conception of how fusion 
centers would fit into the broader homeland security network. 
The key problem lies in the fact that by widening their nets, so to speak, fusion 
centers run the risk of skewing intelligence prioritization toward more of a law 
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enforcement focus, which in many cases has already occurred.  The Northern California 
Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), for instance, functions under a High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) construct, with a logical focus primarily on 
counternarcotics work.  As a result, the NCRIC is likely one of the more competent 
counternarcotics-oriented fusion centers within the national network, but likely lacks the 
level of counterterrorism expertise of the New York or Washington, D.C.-area fusion 
centers, where the threat of terrorism occupies much more of their attention.  Again, this 
branching out to take on more focus areas runs the risk of diluting the overall effort, to 
the point where, by prioritizing a myriad of issues like counternarcotics, gangs, and 
immigration, fusion centers run the risk of losing an essential homeland security focus as 
envisioned in the original legislation creating DHS.  There really has not been a clear 
prioritization of counterterrorism or any other particular area across the board nationally, 
but rather a continual expansion of mission sets to the point where fusion center 
competence in various homeland security areas is widely variable throughout the national 
network. 
C. OVEREMPHASIS ON COLLECTION AT THE EXPENSE OF ANALYSIS 
What has happened with fusion centers in this regard is emblematic of how DHS 
as a department has chosen to deal with intelligence prioritization more broadly.  From 
the earliest days of the nascent DHS intelligence capability, there seems to have been a 
drive to collect as much information as possible (without the requisite link to clearly 
defined intelligence requirements) in the hope that the level of awareness generated by 
such collection would catch up over time.  This was reflected in comments made in 2008 
by the then-under secretary of Homeland Security for I&A, Charles Allen.  Speaking of 
the thousands of customs enforcement interactions conducted every day by 
representatives of DHS’s component agencies, Allen stated, “These encounters generate a 
treasure trove of data that we are just now learning how to report, collate, and share. This 
means that DHS is a collector, producer, and consumer of intelligence, which makes my 
work that much more challenging.”44 
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On the one hand, Allen’s understanding of DHS’s I&A as having a hand in 
virtually all forms of intelligence passing through the components’ hands is admirable 
and in line with what good intelligence officers do.  They constantly seek to expand their 
knowledge of the threat environment by gaining access to greater quantities of 
information so they can stay apprised of the threat and keep their bosses informed.  Allen, 
as one of the influential early figures at I&A, was doing the right thing by trying to get 
DHS intelligence out of its shell and into the fight.  But a long-term consequence of this 
ethos about DHS being simultaneously a “collector, producer, and consumer of 
intelligence” is that, by not prioritizing any one of those functions, DHS has remained 
somewhat mediocre at all of them. 
The reason for this, much like the reason for DHS’s challenges in the areas of 
fusion and institutional evolution, has to do with the problem of scale.  As DHS has 
turned the spigot that has unleashed this deluge of information flowing from its numerous 
and diverse components—TSA, the Coast Guard, CBP, to name a few—I&A has never 
really learned how to prioritize collection and analysis efforts among the components and 
within DHS headquarters to the point where greater sense can be made of the 
overwhelming mass of homeland security information.  Discussions surrounding an 
Aspen Institute report on DHS’s role within the broader IC help illustrate this point. 
In her opening statement at a January 2012 hearing on the contents of the Aspen 
Institute report, Representative Sue Myrick, chairwoman of the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), summed up the prioritization issues DHS’s I&A has 
dealt with from its inception: “This Committee has encouraged I&A to focus its mission 
on the areas where it can provide a unique value added. In years past, the office has 
attempted to gain relevance through its involvement in a wide variety of issues. While I 
certainly can understand the pressure on I&A to spread its arms far and wide, I firmly 
believe that it will gain relevance, and contribute most effectively to the intelligence 
mission, by zeroing in on its core mission.”45  She wholeheartedly endorses the key 
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Aspen Institute observation that, “In an age of budget constraints, pressure on DHS to 
focus on core areas of responsibility and capability—and to avoid emphasis on areas 
performed by other entities—may allow for greater focus on these areas of core 
competency while the agency sheds intelligence functions less central to the DHS 
mission.”46 
Some observers have highlighted the consequences of DHS and its components 
having an unwieldy intelligence collection capability with inadequate coordination.  
Gregory Treverton of RAND notes that one of the key problems associated with the 
challenge of domestic intelligence collection is that “too many agencies are collecting 
information with too little coordination. While there can be benefits to decentralization 
and diversity in activity, having many individual actors operating independently can 
create duplication and conflict.”47  This problem of “duplication and conflict” applies 
both to DHS specifically and the IC as a whole.  Touching briefly on shortcomings 
observed in the coordination of intelligence collection at places such as the FBI’s Field 
Offices and U.S. Attorney’s offices, Treverton brings his focus to DHS: 
Similar questions were raised during the internal DHS review about the 
potential for “multiple points of collection without coordination” within 
the Department’s component agencies intelligence efforts. Broadening 
from coordination of federal efforts to the domestic intelligence enterprise 
overall, state and local organizations  have criticized the lack of a 
consolidated requirements process for homeland security intelligence to 
ensure that collection matches the needs of the relevant consumers.48 
Treverton points out an important trend seen within DHS over its first decade of 
existence whereby its collection efforts have often preceded any kind of strategic plan for 
how to steer that collection in the direction of maximum effectiveness.  The problem of 
“collection without coordination” has seemed to be a secondary concern for planners and 
leadership at DHS, who have appeared to prioritize getting the immense and complex 
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DHS bureaucracy in motion first, and then de-conflicting redundant and duplicative 
efforts within the organization later. 
Perhaps nowhere has this confused sequence of prioritization surfaced more 
vividly than in the manner in which DHS has worked with state fusion centers to 
establish Standing Information Needs (SINs).  After a study concluded that “fusion center 
leaders at pilot sites did not believe that DHS intelligence products fully met their 
mission needs by providing information of operational importance to state and local law 
enforcement,” I&A set about rectifying the problem in 2007 by beginning the process of 
clearly identifying fusion centers’ information needs.49  But as a GAO report released in 
December 2010 notes, “As of August 2010, 9 states had completed efforts to identify 
their information needs, 12 states had completed drafts that were awaiting final state 
approval, and 20 states were in the process of drafting their needs.”50 
This kind of slow, overly deliberate, urgency-defying process is indicative of the 
haphazard way in which DHS has approached the problem of identifying collection 
requirements and, by extension, prioritizing where to place its resources for maximum 
effect.  Admittedly, the state fusion centers themselves must shoulder some of the blame 
for the long delay in identifying their own SINs.  But the fact that I&A was producing 
intelligence for its state and local customers without these SINs being finalized by the 
summer of 2010 is a fact that requires greater scrutiny in its own right.  That essentially 
means that roughly seven years after DHS’s establishment, the organization still had not 
fully taken the basic step of identifying the information that would help its local 
partners—who are often regarded as serving on the front lines in the Global War on 
Terrorism—gain greater awareness of the multivariate asymmetric threat.  This paints a 
picture of DHS over those first five years or so of its existence as having rushed to get as 
much intelligence product out to as many customers as possible, without a clear picture 
of how relevant, timely, or enlightening that intelligence was in the eyes of the customer 
base.  This constitutes one of the fundamental failures of intelligence prioritization on the 
part of DHS. 
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D. LACK OF EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR MEASURING SUCCESS OF 
TARGETED INTELLIGENCE DISTRIBUTION 
Just as it is vitally important for an intelligence-producing organization to clearly 
understand the needs of its intelligence consumers, so too is it critical that an organization 
have in place metrics or feedback mechanisms that allow it to alter course in the event 
that its customers are not satisfied with the intelligence being distributed.  This stands as 
the third area in which DHS has shown a need to better hone how it allocates resources in 
the pursuit of more effective intelligence prioritization.  In numerous instances, it appears 
that DHS or its components have failed to properly self-assess in a way that would allow 
them to become more aware of how well they are doing their job of providing domestic 
intelligence to federal, state, and local customers. 
As the GAO noted in its December 2010 report on information sharing within 
DHS, “According to standard program management principles, time frames or milestones 
should typically be incorporated as part of a road map to achieve a specific desired 
outcome or result.”51  This was a not-so-subtle admonishment of I&A’s leadership for 
taking roughly three years to finalize the SINs of only nine state fusion centers, as 
discussed above.  Unfortunately, the lack of clearly defined goals and effective 
mechanisms for DHS to determine whether it is meeting its goals appears to be a long-
running problem for the department as a whole and its intelligence function in particular.  
But as the GAO report also demonstrates, DHS and its components certainly do not 
suffer from any lack of production: 
From June 2009 through May 2010, I&A disseminated thousands of 
Homeland Intelligence Reports to its state and local partners through 
fusion centers. I&A officials noted that the number of reports 
disseminated has increased over time because of the overall increase in the 
number of submissions from DHS components, such as U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as 
well as greater reporting by state and local partners.52 
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Rather, the real problem is that such significant production has less often been 
distributed in a targeted fashion that would allow I&A and its components to more 
precisely tailor intelligence to specific constituencies.  Challenges faced by TSA in this 
regard illustrate the point well. 
As the GAO noted in its November 2011 report on information sharing among 
TSA and its transportation sector stakeholders, despite general agreement by those 
stakeholders that TSA provides valuable intelligence, there remains room for 
improvement in how TSA continually monitors whether its transportation sector 
customers are getting the intelligence they need.  The GAO observed that the lack of a 
more “targeted outreach” approach was limiting TSA’s efforts to reach as many 
customers as possible, resulting in an uneven familiarity among stakeholders with TSA’s 
primary dissemination tool, the Homeland Security Information Sharing Network Critical 
Sectors portal (HSIN-CS): 
The absence of measurable outcomes for targeted outreach to different 
transportation sectors hinders DHS efforts to ensure dissemination of 
security-related information to all appropriate stakeholders. DHS’s 
outreach efforts have not resulted in widespread HSIN-CS awareness and 
use among transportation stakeholders who we surveyed, and therefore 
conducting targeted outreach to stakeholders, and measuring the 
effectiveness of this outreach, could help to increase awareness and use of 
this mechanism.53 
As the GAO analysis suggests, it is very difficult as an organization to know 
whether your efforts are on the right track if there is a lacking or nonexistent mechanism 
in place for understanding whether those on the receiving end of your work are better 
able to do their jobs as a result of it.  This is a problem that has plagued not only TSA but 
various elements throughout DHS’s I&A since inception.  The argument is not with a 
lack of effort but with an occasional lack of “targeted” effort that would allow I&A’s 
components to more effectively prioritize their intelligence collection and analysis and 
the allocation of human resources toward those ends.  This is likely merely the result of 
nascent bureaucratic practices still in their evolutionary infancy, but it is a problem that 
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DHS needs to address nonetheless.  I&A’s intelligence-producing components cannot 
genuinely know where they are going until they know where they have been, and right 
now they have demonstrated an uneven awareness of just how effectively they have 
supported their stakeholders over the last decade of their work.  Until that gets rectified, 
effective and consistent intelligence prioritization—whereby the right resources are 
allocated in the right places at the right times—cannot occur. 
E. REDUNDANCIES, AMBIGUITIES, AND LOST ACCOUNTABILITY 
RESULTING FROM OVERLAPPING MISSIONS 
One of the primary challenges to effective intelligence prioritization within DHS 
has been the prevalence of duplicative responsibilities among component agencies, 
resulting in blurred lines of authority, redundant effort, and decreased accountability.  
With a more precisely defined set of responsibilities allocated among its components, 
DHS could get greater bang for its intelligence buck while pinning sole accountability for 
specific mission areas on a smaller but potentially more responsive set of actors.  In the 
end, this would be a good prioritization move to the extent that it would preserve precious 
resources in a tightening fiscal environment while promoting greater de-confliction of 
effort among its myriad collection and analytical endeavors. 
As Representative Myrick stated in January 2012 at the aforementioned 
congressional hearing on the contents of the Aspen Institute report on DHS, “I&A 
historically has suffered from a lack of focus in its mission. This challenge partially stems 
from vague or overlapping authorities in some areas.”54  Discussing areas of overlap 
between DHS and other federal agencies such as the FBI, she went on to add, “It is clear 
that in these areas overlapping authorities and responsibilities created by federal law and 
policy have contributed to confusion and duplicative efforts. Moreover, the vagueness of 
some of DHS’s responsibilities and authorities has allowed for some interpretation by 
I&A with regard to its mission.”55  This basic theme threads through analysis of DHS 
from other quarters as well. 
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The GAO points out the results of a study conducted by the Homeland Security 
Institute (HSI) in 2009 in which it was noted that the “lack of a strategic plan hindered 
I&A’s efforts to conduct any type of officewide program or resource planning that could 
be appropriately tied to its mission, goals, and objectives.”56  The report goes on to 
discuss the consequences of this lack of strategic guidance: 
As a result, HSI found that various I&A components had developed their 
own goals, priorities, processes, and procedures and, in some cases, may 
be working at cross-purposes. HSI also found that the lack of I&A efforts 
to allocate resources to support strategic goals and objectives prevented 
managers from organizing their efforts for long-term effectiveness, which 
left them unable to plan for growth or to adapt to emerging issues.57 
That last point about I&A’s resulting inability to adequately “adapt to emerging 
issues” is an important one when considering the broader issue of intelligence 
prioritization.  As this passage from the GAO report indicates, the fact that individual 
components within I&A resorted to generating their own priorities and procedures 
suggests that the components were allocating resources and conducting their collection 
and analytical work irrespective of what their peer agencies were doing.  When such a 
situation exists, and the overall construct is defined more by the lack of coordination than 
its prevalence, the ability of the organization to adapt—a critical requirement in effective 
intelligence prioritization—is severely compromised. 
However, the responsibility for this prevailing ambiguity and confusion over what 
specific I&A components own which pieces of the intelligence pie does not rest solely 
with I&A planners and leaders themselves.  As last year’s Tenth Anniversary Report 
Card points out, Congress must shoulder some of the blame for pulling DHS in numerous 
directions in the course of its oversight efforts.  Responding over the last few years to 
thousands of briefing requests and hundreds of requests for testimony from over 100 
congressional committees, DHS has remained significantly occupied with the mere 
process of keep Congress abreast of its work.  But as the Report Card pointedly suggests, 
“The result is that DHS receives conflicting guidance and Congress lacks one picture of 
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how that enormous organization is functioning. Congress should be helping integrate the 
sprawling DHS; a fragmented oversight approach defeats that purpose.”58 
Whether due to congressional oversight issues, the sprawling nature of its 
bureaucratic makeup, or the relative newness of its domestic intelligence mission, DHS 
continues to wrestle with the challenge of how best to prioritize the allocation of its 
resources so as to maximize the security of the homeland.  This is no easy task with 22 
competing agencies under one umbrella, but there persists this sense that occasionally 
within DHS the right hand does not fully know what the left hand is doing.  While this is 
not due to any lack of effort on the part of agencies or components to contribute to the 
overall homeland security mission—I&A, for example, has produced steadily more 
intelligence for its customers over the last several years—that effort continually lacks the 
strategic direction that would allow the department as a whole to more effectively 
allocate its resources to those areas of highest priority and reduce some of the duplicative 
effort and ambiguous authority that is increasingly characteristic of how DHS operates. 
Similar issues of ambiguous authority and redundant lines of effort have become 
an obstacle to more streamlined intelligence prioritization within the broader IC as well.  
Highlighting some of the areas of concern that were identified by the group of experts 
and practitioners he interviewed for his RAND report on alternative organizational 
options for the U.S. domestic intelligence system, Treverton noted prevailing concerns 
over “confusion,” “ambiguity,” and uncertain responsibility at the national level: 
“Interviewees and panel members highlighted concerns that similar activities are 
proliferating at different places within the domestic intelligence system. Participants cited 
this as a result of confusion and ambiguity about the roles of particular agencies within 
the domestic intelligence enterprise and uncertainty about who is responsible for what 
parts of the effort.”59 
Treverton sees reinforcement of these concerns in the 2005 WMD Commission 
Report.  Citing the negative effects of duplicative analytical efforts at the national level 
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on the ability of state and local authorities to fulfill their domestic intelligence 
responsibilities, he enlists as evidence one of the WMD Commission’s key findings: 
The redundant lines of communication through which terrorism-related 
information is passed—for example, through the Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, Homeland Security 
Information Network, TTIC Online, Law Enforcement Online Network, 
Centers for Disease Control alerts, and Public Health Advisories, to name 
just a few—present a deluge of information for which state, local, and 
tribal authorities are neither equipped nor trained to process, prioritize, and 
disseminate.60 
The multiplicity of agencies and networks devoted to terrorism-related 
intelligence distribution reflects the overarching challenge to intelligence prioritization 
posed by the vastness of the national domestic intelligence infrastructure.  State and local 
law enforcements authorities, as the front line in the domestic security effort, have access 
to such a large amount of information that it has become difficult for them to prioritize 
one source of intelligence over another.  The domestic intelligence system as currently 
constructed places the bulk of the burden on local entities to decide what information is 
of highest priority.  In the case of state fusion centers with limited manning and whose 
analysts are not always career intelligence professionals but are often law enforcement or 
public safety officials trained in intelligence analysis as a collateral duty, this extra 
burden is no trivial matter.  The current system has placed a premium on the notion that 
the federal government should never be the last to hold vital information.  But in doing 
so, there has not been a sufficient emphasis on the local consumer side to allow the end 
users of the federal government’s vast intelligence resources to more effectively prioritize 
need-to-know intelligence over good-to-have information. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Both DHS and the broader IC have improved by leaps and bounds in terms of 
their collective ability to push information to the customer at the end of intelligence 
chain.  Through DHS’s I&A and its component intelligence elements, the domestic 
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intelligence infrastructure is far more robust than it was before the 9/11 attacks.  Likewise 
in the IC, the establishment of NCTC has helped create a culture of terrorism-related 
information sharing among federal departments and agencies that was in desperate need 
of improvement in the aftermath of 9/11.  But the point has come where it is now time to 
move on from the general attempt to stand up new institutions and begin to focus on 
process refinement and more effective prioritization.  The domestic intelligence system 
has shown an ability to gather large quantities of information and distribute it across a 
broad collection of federal, state, and local organizations.  Unfortunately, that alone will 
no longer be sufficient over the next ten years of DHS and the IC’s evolution. 
Representative Mike Thompson, Ranking Member of HPSCI’s Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, said simply of the future of 
DHS, “It now makes sense to step back from daily oversight and consider the pros and 
cons of expansion of the DHS intelligence mission to other areas, such as cybersecurity. 
[…] The question is not just what DHS Intelligence should do in the future, but whether 
DHS is able to do it.”61  This encapsulates perfectly well the crossroads at which the U.S. 
domestic intelligence system as a whole currently finds itself.  Instead of constantly 
seeking additional missions and looking for more ways to make itself relevant, it is time 
for DHS and the numerous domestic security-related agencies within the IC to begin 
looking within to determine how better to prioritize their efforts and become more user-
friendly for the thousands of frontline responders around the country who rely on their 
information.  The final chapter, which follows, will explore alternative approaches that 
DHS and the IC can employ to create a more honed-in, efficient domestic security 
enterprise. 
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V. THE WORK HAS JUST BEGUN: CONSIDERING 
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
Having discussed the myriad challenges posed for DHS and the IC by issues 
associated with domestic intelligence fusion, institutional evolution, and intelligence 
prioritization, it is important to examine common problems within those areas and what, 
if anything, can be done to mitigate them and chart a new path forward that incorporates 
alternative approaches to those already tested over the last decade.  As with many large 
undertakings, the key challenges in the domestic intelligence field appear to be 
organizational, with continuing struggles to channel the considerable manpower and 
resources invested in the homeland security arena over the last decade toward more 
efficient and effective ends.  The solution likely lies not in breaking up the puzzle and 
beginning completely anew, but rather in tweaking pieces of the puzzle here and there in 
order to come to a more comprehensible and logical arrangement of parts. 
This final chapter will briefly examine the prospects for consolidation and 
specialization within the U.S. domestic intelligence system.  Key within this debate is the 
idea that U.S. domestic security is not best served by a top-down, conventionally 
hierarchical intelligence structure.  Instead, leaders need to consider the benefits of 
adopting the tactics of the most capable asymmetric adversaries arrayed against the 
United States.  This includes an organizational ability to drive responsibility and 
execution down to the lowest levels, which breeds greater adaptability in the face of 
frequent changes to the threat landscape.  In addition, some notable voices have 
expressed concern over an artificially rigid divide between domestic and foreign 
intelligence which, despite the landmark reforms enacted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 
continues to influence the way important intelligence agencies interact with each other in 
Washington.  Finally, the introduction of so many new DHS subcomponents with 
indigenous intelligence capabilities of their own necessitates a brief discussion of 
whether the IC should be formally expanded to provide a better seat at the table for 
domestically-focused intelligence agencies. 
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A. CONSOLIDATION 
One common criticism of the current domestic intelligence architecture that 
surfaces from various analyses is that the system in place now remains too disjointed, 
fractured, and bureaucratically dispersed to achieve the optimal level of responsiveness to 
a dynamic and rapidly changing domestic threat environment.  Gregory Treverton of 
RAND has brought to light the observations of several high-level practitioners and 
domestic security experts who feel this way and others have chimed in on this subject as 
well.  And while some have pointed out the fact of this disjointedness within the domestic 
intelligence system, others have proposed alternative means of approaching the issue of 
domestic intelligence in an effort to address the problem of disjointedness.  For example, 
Luis Garicano and Richard Posner have proposed consolidation within the IC on a grand 
scale: “One possibility that deserves serious consideration would be a consolidation of 
most existing agencies into four primary agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a 
military intelligence agency, a domestic intelligence agency, and a technical data 
collection agency (satellite mapping, electronic interception, etc.).”62 
While the merits of Garicano and Posner’s proposal across the entire IC are open 
to debate, the main thrust of their argument for a simplified intelligence structure 
resonates particularly strongly when applied to DHS’s I&A and the multitude of DHS 
intelligence elements it  must coordinate.  On the one hand, there are benefits to having 
distinct intelligence elements within such disparate DHS agencies as CBP, ICE, USCIS, 
TSA, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.  One could argue that each of these 
agencies performs a critical domestic security function encompassing thousands of 
routine and high-interest interactions every day.  On the other hand, the existence of six 
separate intelligence elements within the DHS Intelligence umbrella alone suggests the 
potential for information overload, challenges with inter-agency coordination, and 
uncertain accountability, which the preceding chapters have discussed in detail. 
To remedy some of these recurring problems, it might be wise to take a Garicano 
and Posner approach to the organization of DHS Intelligence.  Rather than continuing 
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with the multiplicity of intelligence elements within the various components that has 
come to dominate the current organizational arrangement, planners could seriously 
consider the possibility of refining DHS’ intelligence functions down to a set of core 
focus areas.  For example, CBP, ICE, and USCIS, while not sharing identical missions by 
any stretch of the imagination, do arguably cover common territory in the conduct of 
their daily duties.  Rather than have three distinct intelligence elements working for each 
of these agencies in different office space and with different marching orders from their 
agency bosses, an alternative would be to consolidate their intelligence functions within 
an Illicit Flows Intelligence Directorate within DHS, encompassing the areas of 
counternarcotics, customs enforcement, and immigration. 
Similarly, TSA and the Coast Guard, which are responsible for distinct 
components of the transportation landscape, do nonetheless share an important focus on 
securing vital components of the nation’s infrastructure system.  Planners could feasibly 
consolidate the intelligence elements of TSA and the Coast Guard within an 
Infrastructure Intelligence Directorate that would be responsible for incorporating DHS’ 
varied infrastructure intelligence functions.  A Counterterrorism Intelligence Directorate 
could be charged with maintaining a critical linkage with NCTC and the CIA and FBI’s 
respective counterterrorism capabilities, along the lines of the FBI’s new Joint Regional 
Intelligence Group (JRIG) concept, which would share collocation in major urban fusion 
centers with the DNI’s Domestic Intelligence Representatives.  Finally, a Cyber 
Intelligence Directorate within DHS would help to focus the department’s efforts in a 
realm in which it has made clear it would like to be a key player, but for which its 
capabilities are still in a maturing phase and lack the robustness of its Defense 
Department counterparts at the National Security Agency. 
B. SPECIALIZATION 
While consolidation within DHS in particular could go a long way toward 
focusing the department’s efforts on a key set of critical mission areas, a drive toward 
more specialization within DHS and the IC as a whole with respect to domestic 
intelligence operations could have the effect of enhancing accountability and empowering 
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those analysts at the lower, and consequently more responsive, levels of the domestic 
intelligence system.  Under Secretary Wagner highlighted a promising concept in this 
regard in the congressional testimony she gave in May 2010: 
One of the main improvements, I think, that is being made in the 
intelligence community is the idea of these pursuit groups, where we are 
charging people to take hold of a specific piece of information and follow 
it all the way through, to pull that string to find everything else, and to 
institutionalize that approach so that we don’t have compartmentalization, 
you know, like, “I am assuming that this guy here did something on this so 
I am not going to check to make sure it got done.”63 
A pursuit group approach implemented more consistently across the domestic 
intelligence system has the potential to cut across all three of the primary problem areas 
discussed in this paper.  Such an approach could help improve intelligence fusion by 
charging a specific person or group of people with correlating data in a manner that 
would force them to interface with other agencies.  It could partially sidestep the growing 
pains associated with institutional evolution by driving ultimate responsibility for a 
mission or focus area to a smaller, more responsive group of specialists in a given area.  
And it could potentially improve intelligence prioritization by creating small groups or 
individuals who are well-versed in what it takes to distinguish background noise from 
crucially relevant intelligence that is vital to the isolation of a threat to domestic security. 
Henry Crumpton takes this concept of the pursuit group approach a step further 
by proposing the possibility of establishing a “domestic security intelligence corps” and a 
“special agent-case officer (SACO)” position, as a way of specializing the unique skills 
required for domestic intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination.64  This idea 
also has merit in that it gets to the heart of a historically-based challenge within the FBI 
in particular concerning an institutionally ingrained unwillingness within that 
organization to acknowledge intelligence professionals as on par with their special agent 
peers.  By professionalizing the homeland security intelligence analyst as a distinct career 
choice for an aspiring young person entering the domestic intelligence field today, there 
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exists the potential to breed a whole cadre of future experts in a field that is perhaps still 
defined more by the tricky civil liberties questions it poses than any hard and fast truths 
about how best to tackle the thorny issues of domestic protection.  What is clear is that 
the status quo method of making domestic intelligence analysis a collateral duty for some 
(as in many fusion centers) or a position of low regard for others (as in the FBI) is a 
temporary band-aid that will not serve the nation’s domestic security interests well in the 
future. 
C. THE FOREIGN-DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVIDE 
One of the primary issues contributing to a perception of the domestic intelligence 
system as being fairly disjointed and fractured at the macro level is the persistence of a 
divide between foreign and domestic intelligence that often hinders better coordination.  
Just as consolidation and specialization could potentially address the handful of 
shortcomings detailed in this paper, so too could bridging the divide between foreign and 
domestic intelligence help to create a more seamless domestic intelligence system. 
Art Hulnick captures the dilemma well in his discussion of the drawbacks of 
having a Cold War-era legacy of divided foreign and domestic intelligence operations 
persist into a new era in which groups like Al Qaeda do not abide by the same rules of 
engagement as the Soviets did.  As one of his proposed areas of intelligence reform going 
forward, Hulnick has suggested doing away with this “artificial” divide: 
The fifth area of reform would end the artificial barriers between foreign 
and domestic intelligence in collection and analysis. This relic of the Cold 
War era had resulted from fears that intelligence agencies might become 
secret police agencies, as had happened in Nazi Germany, the military 
dictatorship of wartime Japan, and the Communist state of the Soviet 
Union. Terrorism, espionage, and global crime do not respect such 
boundaries. To establish an efficient intelligence system that actually 
shares information and works together, the rules and laws that maintain 
the split between foreign and domestic operations and research must be 
changed.65 
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Hulnick’s point is an important one that deserves further consideration by 
domestic security planners.  By multiple accounts, the U.S. counterterrorism effort 
abroad has been very successful in isolating and neutralizing the threat to the homeland 
emanating from violent extremist organizations abroad, particularly their top leadership.  
Concerns over civil liberties here in the United States notwithstanding, domestic 
intelligence operations should be joined at the hip with counterterrorism operations 
overseas.  Agencies like NCTC have gone a long way toward achieving this, but more at 
the strategic level than the operational.  There needs to be more integration between 
domestic and foreign operations.  Crumpton echoes this point, saying, “Another 
challenge for intelligence in homeland defense is to bridge the gap between domestic and 
foreign operations. Existing links need to be reinforced and new links forged.”66 
D. ACTING LIKE THE ADVERSARY IN ORDER TO DEFEAT IT 
Perhaps most unsettling to domestic experts and average citizens alike in the post-
9/11 environment has been a realization that the adversaries of the United States today 
are more commonly the small, networked, agile, asymmetrically-inclined foes like Al 
Qaeda and Anonymous who represent a far less predictable threat than the Soviets did 
more than 20 years ago.  As a result, it is incumbent upon the U.S. domestic intelligence 
system to realize that the most effective way to confront such a distinct type of adversary 
is not to rely on the Cold War model that fit the IC’s needs so well during that time 
period, but to transition to a smaller, more networked, more agile intelligence approach 
that challenges the adversaries on their terms. 
The creation of state fusion centers that provide a space to concentrate 
intelligence and law enforcement representatives from federal, state, local, and tribal 
entities has been a solid step in the direction of creating a more networked, agile line of 
defense.  But to a significant degree, many of the more robust intelligence collection and 
analysis capabilities still reside with the Washington-based agencies that make up the IC.  
DHS Intelligence illustrates the hybrid nature of the current arrangement.  A full-fledged 
member of the IC, DHS possesses a seat at the national-level intelligence table equal to 
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that of its peers at the FBI and CIA.  As previously discussed, it also possesses the 
intelligence capabilities of six distinct components—CBP, ICE, USCIS, TSA, the Coast 
Guard, and the Secret Service—which are all organized in the sort of top-down 
hierarchical structure that is common among Washington agencies. 
The real disconnect is that while much responsibility has been driven down to the 
lowest levels through the creation of state fusion centers, much of the heavy lifting in 
terms of collection and analysis continues to be done at the national level, thereby 
fostering a certain level of dependence of state and local authorities on the cooperation 
and competence of national-level authorities.  As Crumpton suggests, a possible remedy 
for this dependency relationship between local and national authorities would be to allow 
more locally-oriented intelligence and law enforcement officials to have the autonomy to 
build greater networks among themselves: “The United States should encourage 
intelligence and law enforcement leaders in the field to build interdependent networks 
among themselves and to act decisively, rather than harness them to a distant, centralized, 
layered system of operational planning.”67  This could at least partially address the 
current status quo within U.S. domestic intelligence in which the FBI does not share 
classified collection plans with state and local authorities, leaving those authorities to 
have to sometimes guess what it is important to collect against. 
The pitfalls associated with a “distant, centralized, layered system of operational 
planning” have been noted numerous times in this paper—whether it be the failure of 
DHS to work in a timely manner with the states to identify SINs or the occasional 
distribution by DHS Intelligence of information not particularly well-suited to local 
customers’ needs.  What is needed in the future is to take the capabilities being brought to 
bear now and rearrange them in a way that will further empower analysts and law 
enforcement personnel at the lowest levels.  The conventional top-down approach will 
simply not stand the test of time as adversaries become smaller, more agile, and less apt 
to think like the big bureaucracies aligned against them in the domestic intelligence 
arena. 
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E. SHOULD THE IC BE EXPANDED? 
Finally, a possible remedy to the difficulties of coordinating the varied 
intelligence capabilities within DHS would be to grant individual IC membership status 
to CBP, ICE, USCIS, TSA, and the Secret Service (with the Coast Guard already serving 
as a formal member of the IC).  While this could potentially bestow upon these 
components greater legitimacy and networking opportunities in the eyes of formidable 
peers like NSA, the FBI, and the CIA, the downside risk is that DHS’ component 
agencies would be pulled even further from local entities, with which there exists an 
uneven and still nascent relationship in the first place.  The risks of expanding the IC and 
granting formal status to those five components outweigh the benefits.  The problems of 
coordination within DHS are an internal matter that can and should be rectified by the 
Under Secretary for I&A, and a possible realignment along the lines of what has been 
proposed earlier in this chapter would go a long way toward solving issues of interagency 
intelligence coordination within DHS. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A little more than a decade after the 9/11 attacks, it comes as no surprise that 
DHS and the IC still need more time to fully mature and develop the domestic 
intelligence system.  The broad areas of challenge discussed in this thesis—intelligence 
fusion, institutional evolution, and intelligence prioritization—to a large degree present 
understandable obstacles that senior leaders and planners simply need more time to 
grapple with.  The system is by its very nature a vast collection of competing agencies 
and interests, so fusion would predictably present new challenges.  The relatively recent 
arrival of new entities like DHS, NCTC, and DNI clearly need more time to solidify their 
bureaucratic foundations.  And the system as a whole needs to learn how to get all of the 
disparate parts to work together in order to avoid duplicative effort and focus on what is 
truly critical in securing the homeland. 
But acknowledging all of this is not to lose sight of a central reality: these three 
areas need to be addressed with a serious level of urgency within the domestic 
intelligence community.  The terrorist threat will remain persistent, as it has since the 
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9/11 attacks, and the looming threat of fiscal tightening will add a new dimension to the already 
difficult task before homeland security specialists.  The increasingly urgent focus within the 
public sector of searching for greater efficiencies in every bureaucratic nook and cranny will 
not simply pass by the domestic intelligence sphere, somehow leaving it unscathed.  Just as the 
Defense Department and federal entitlement programs will need to scale back in order to 
address significant long-term debt problems, so too will DHS and the IC as a whole.  Just as in 
a private enterprise, domestic intelligence leaders will need to prove themselves expert at 
getting the most out of their budgets, and in many cases this will require fresh and creative 
thinking, which this final chapter has hopefully just begun to touch upon. 
It is clear that many within the domestic intelligence arena have worked tirelessly to 
make the system more responsive and seamless.  It is also clear that the incentives to generate 
even more responsiveness and seamlessness will not go away anytime soon, as asymmetric 
threats to the homeland proliferate.  While the American public often displays a short-term 
memory over these kinds of issues, senior policy makers cannot afford to do the same.  
Whether we admit or not, Al Qaeda is evolving, Anonymous is evolving, and a whole host of 
other actors, both known and unknown, are evolving in ways yet to be seen.  The task of 
getting America’s domestic intelligence capabilities up to speed has just begun, and there is 
more work to be done. 
What the federal government must do going forward is to train specialists in the 
domestic intelligence field—specialists in cyber threats, infrastructure, the flow of goods and 
people, and counterterrorism—and then breed a culture of cross-collaboration that will allow 
them to succeed individually and as a community.  But the DHS model of attempting to create 
a big tent where everyone becomes a generalist in all matters of concern to the homeland is not 
working.  We need our own super-empowered individuals to counter the super-empowered 
individuals arrayed against us, to borrow a Thomas Friedman term.  By being smarter with its 
resources and taking greater care in how it delegates responsibilities across the domestic 
intelligence bureaucracy, Washington can help DHS and others focus more effectively on only 
those tasks for which they are best suited, allowing those agencies with the greatest competence 
in their respective fields to take the lead.  Such a concerted effort will help make for a safer 
homeland. 
 60 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Allen, Charles. “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for Homeland 
Security.” Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 6, 
2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terrorism-in-the-
twenty-first-century-implications-for-homeland-security. 
Blair, Dennis C. “Strengthening Our Front Line of Defense.” Washington Post Op-Ed, 
December 18, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-12-
18/news/36806239_1_intelligence-reform-intelligence-agencies-national-
intelligence. 
Cardillo, Robert. “Intelligence Community Reform: A Cultural Evolution.” Studies in 
Intelligence 54 (2010): 1–7. 
 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction. Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf.  
“Concern over DHS Move to Create Giant Information Databank.” Homeland Security 
News Wire, December 8, 2011, 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111208-concern-over-dhs-
move-to-create-giant-information-databank. 
Crumpton, Henry A. “Intelligence and Homeland Defense.” In Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence, edited by Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, 198–219. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 
Dilanian, Ken. “U.S. Counter-Terrorism Agents Still Hamstrung by Data-Sharing 
Failures.” Los Angeles Times, October 4, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/04/nation/la-naw-terrorism-data-100510. 
A DHS Intelligence Enterprise: Still Just a Vision or Reality? Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (May 12, 2010) 
(statements of Caryn Wagner, Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Intelligence and Analysis, and Jane Harman, Chair of the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the 
Committee on Homeland Security). 




Garicano, Luis, and Richard A Posner. “What Our Spies Can Learn From Toyota.” Wall 
Street Journal Op-Ed, January 12, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870458650457465426199863374
6.html. 
Hulnick, Arthur S. “Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?” International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21 (2008): 621–34. 
National Security Preparedness Group. Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 
9/11 Commission Recommendations. Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 
September 2011. 
Perrow, Charles. “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the  
 Intelligence Reorganization.” Homeland Security Affairs II (2006): 1–32. 
 
The Role of DHS in the IC: A Report by the Aspen Institute. Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 112th Cong. (January 18, 2012) 
(statements of Rep. Sue Myrick, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Rep. Mike Thompson, the subcommittee’s 
Ranking Member). 
Transportation Security Information Sharing: Stakeholders Generally Satisfied but TSA 
Could Improve Analysis, Awareness, and Accountability, GAO-12-44, November 
2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586430.pdf. 
Treverton, Gregory F. Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options. 
Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General. DHS’ Efforts To 
Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion 
Centers, OIG-12-10, November 2011, 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-10_Nov11.pdf. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define 
How It Plans to Meet Its State and Local Mission and Improve Performance 
Accountability, GAO-11-223, December 2010, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314114.pdf. 
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security 
Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, by Todd Masse. 
CRS Report RL33616.Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, August 18, 2006. 
 
 63 
U.S. Senate. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers. 
Majority and Minority Staff Report for the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, October 3, 2012, 
http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/100312cc1.pdf. 
Zegart, Amy B. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton: 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
